Vízügyi Közlemények, 1955 (37. évfolyam)

1-2. füzet - XIV. Lászlóffy Woldemár: Az árvíz előrejelzése

(10) ORGANIZATION OF FLOOD PREVENTION P. Szászhelyi and J. Sik (Tables on pp. 53—33. of Hungarian text) UDC. 627.512 + 627.513 (439.1) The Danube flood of July 1954, by its high level and duration, put the flood prevention service to a heavy test. Flood prevention work was done along a main protection line of 799 km, of which 166 km fell on discharge sections of tributary rivers and 107 km into I lie area of major cit ies. Lists of 5 District Water Boards, of their 23 protection sections, the number of levee guard posts, the date of order and of discontinuance of preparedness, and the lengths of the protection works are given in Table I. Table II. lists summer levees inside of the principal protection works and llie size of their protected areas (one cadastral yoke equals 5755 m

2). Since the flood occured in midsummer, preventive work had to be extended to summer levees as well, at least until crops were gathered in. Most trouble was caused by deficiency of freebord and of bottom width of levees. Along 20 km the flood was higher than the levees, because reinforcement work resumed after the war could not be completed everywhere. Leaders of flood prevention well knew these shortcomings and were well prepared for defence. Deficiency of freebord did not cause harm anywhere. Improvised topping of levees prevented them from being overfloodvd. Dangerous slope slides, soaking and dangerous development of some pipings were prevented from becoming fatal by vigorous action. Levee bursts were caused by hydraulic ground failure that could not be combated. Technical preparedness was good and the efficiency of defence work was boosted by rapidly moving motorized sheetpiling squads of the Central Flood Protection Service. After the establishment of the National Water Board in 1953 cooperation of several ministries and of local councils for*flood prevention was organized so that the flood surprised nobody ; everybody knew Iiis duly. However the flood of unusual size put the organization to such tests in some places, especially after the levee bursts in Szigetköz, which the leadership could not master at once. Therefore already during flood prevention work the Flood Commissioner made certain organizational changes to reinforce soft points of defence. Such measures were : Reorganization and reinforcement of the Central Office of the Commissioner, tightening connections with the ministries, transfer of personnel trained in protection work fron; Tisza and Kőrös River to places in danger. Deputy Commissioners or delegates were sent to places where there appeared to be some irresolution in leadership. The Council of Ministers established the National Flood Commissionersliip and thé County Flood Prevention Committees with the aid of which manpower, transport equipment, earthmoving machinery and materials were mobilized over the entire area of the country. (Table III. illustrates the organization.) This mighty concentration of forces organised and directed by the Ministries produced a national assistance never seen before, the dimensions and power of which could not be eveir imagined. Most effective help was given by Army units as well as by organized transport services. Voluntary labour force played comparatively a minor part, and the majority of the population had time to gather in crops. The flood protection service is being reorganized on the basis of experience gathered, and a program is being drafted to make possible the planned concentration of forces on the proper place and in the proper time, without a hitch, in case of future flood disasters.