Századok – 2004

Tanulmányok - Pogány Ágnes: Magyarország deviza- és árfolyampolitikája a német „Új Gazdasági Rend”-ben VI/1305

MAGYARORSZÁG AZ „ÚJ GAZDASÁGI RENDBEN" 1935-1945 1325 Német klíring Európai klíring 1938. december 30,1 _ 1939. december 50,5 _ • 1940. december 0,1 0,2 1941. június 46,9 3,0 1941. szeptember 103,8 8,2 1941. december 193,0 9,6 1942. január 220,5 11,1 1942. február 255,6 11,8 1942. március 288,6 12,4 1942. április 341,4 _ 1942. május 442,9 _ 1942. szeptember 522,0 1942. december 577,0 1943. június 747,3 _ 1943. november 988,0 _ 1943. december 1045,0 -1944. július 1006,0 - 1 Forrás: BA Deutsche Reichsbank Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung, R 2501/6329; 2501/6448; ΒΑ Geschäftsberichte der Deutschen Verrechnungskasse R 2/13691/a. THE CURRENCY RATE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE POLICY OF HUNGARY IN THE GERMAN „NEW ECONOMIC ORDER", 1935-1945 By Agnes Pogány (Summary) In the 1930s several Central and East European countries, such as Germany and Hungary, faced the necessity of regulating the exchange rate of their currency. Having accumulated an enormous amount of foreign debts and gone bankrupt, in 1931 these countries introduced a fixed exchange rate policy, suspended the convertibility of their currency, and centralized the regulation of the currency rates. These measures had a basically defensive character, and were intended to prevent the total collapse of the economic and financial system. Yet during World War II the foreign exchange policy assumed new significance for Nazi Germany. By modifying the exchange rates of the currencies Germany was able to profit from unilateral advantages in the exchange of goods, improve her balance of trade, and thus mobilise more resources in order to finance the war. At the same time Germany's foreign exchange policy frequently served direct political aims, such as forcing the allied and conquered peoples to acknowledge German superiority and dominance by revaluing the imperial Mark against their own currencies. The present study analyses the emergence and development of the German currency rate and foreign exchange policy. It shows through the example of German-Hungarian relations the practical manifestations of the German conception of exchange rates, the alternatives which presented themselves for the Hungarian economic policy in the face of the increasing German demands of the nazi government, and the role that the Hungarian National Bank played throughout the ever sharpening conflicts. The period in question can be divided into two roughly equal parts. From the end of 1935 until September 1939 the Hungarian National Bank and the financial administration was still able to make relatively independent decisions, in the framework of the fixed exchange rate policy, concerning the exchange rate of the non-convertible pengő. The German government made no objections when Hungary, during the transformation of the extra-charge system, devalued the Mark against the convertible currencies, thereby trying to transfer her foreign trade towards the convertible markets. After the outbreak of World War II, however, Germany's attitude gradually changed. The German government exerted ever increasing pressure on Hungary in order to force her to acknowledge the equality of the German Mark \. ith the convertible currencies by revaluing the former, and thus to demonstrate the leading role of the Reichsmark (RM) in the economic area dominated by Germany. From 1940 another