Folia Theologica 2. (1991)
Francisco J. Urrkutia: The Magisterium: how it works
THE MAGISTERIUM 21 Because a magisterial or teaching act, that is to say the proposition of some doctrinal point, addresses itself specifically to the intellect, one could perhaps wonder why both the Council and the canon mention the submission not only of the intellect but also of the will. The reason is the particular evidence that commands the submission of our intellects in the case of the non-infallible teaching of the pope. As I said (n° 7) our acceptance of the concrete teaching is based on the pope’s religious competence to teach, his mission, the received authority, the assistance of the Spirit. However, it may very well happen that the intrinsic reasons of the proposed doctrine may not appear to us very clear, perhaps they may appear to be not very convincing and, to somer, they may even apperar... to be wrong! In each of these cases, the extrinsic evidence of his religious competence remains with all its value. If we accept that evidence and consequently if our wills are ready to submit to him whom the Lord wanted to be our religious guide, then our wills will incline our intellects to bow to what is taught, setting aside whatever apparent intrinsic evidence our intelects might consider contrary to the pope’s teaching. This psychological influence of our wills on our intellects happens continuously in our lives. It is at the base of our biases when we conclude that our country is right in deciding something against another Country. And in broader terms, it is a fact that when we love someone we tend to see eye to eye-we could say intellect to intellect, with that person or, in other words, we tend to conform our intellects to the loved person’s views. 9. At this point we need to dispel some obscurities that may easily create confusion. We are dealing with non-infallible teachings. Now, is it not the very meaning of non-infallible teaching that it is reformable? And if it is reformable, that it is not certain? And that, therefore, it is liable to being wrong, as I recalled above (n“-4) that CURRAN asserted? How can, then, the H. Father demand that we take for certain a doctrine that is by definition reformable, uncertain, perhaps wrong? Such a position seems indeed to involve a contradiction. It is necessary to understand that non-infallible teaching means simply that it is not proposed to us as demanding an act of faith. It does not necessarily
