Folia Theologica 2. (1991)
Francisco J. Urrkutia: The Magisterium: how it works
22 FJ. URRUTIA mean that it is proposed as just an opinion that, however worthy of respect because of the competence of the person who proposes it, cannot be proposed as certain. In fact, non-infallible is not, by definition, reformable. It is true that infallible propositions are qualified as irreformable by LG 25, 3 as they were by Vatican I (D. 3074/1839). But it does not follow that the inverted proposition non-infallible doctrines are reformable is necessarily true. Why, in fact, are the infallible teachings irreformable? Because they are true. If then, a non-infallible proposition is true, it will be also irreformable. The problem obviously is how we know? In the case of infallible propositions, we know because the competent authority teaches us, with the absolute guaranty of truth, that such doctrine comes from revelation. The same authority, however, is competent, as I said before, to teach us truths connected with our faith, although not founded in revelation but in other compelling reasons, that is, to teach us with certainty non-infallible doctrines. 10. Let me put this in a different way. We have to grasp the distinction between truth and our perception of it. Truth belongs to the objective order; perception belongs to the subjective sphere. Truth is one, in accord with reality as God himself sees it; perception is multiple according to each person’s capabilities. Truth is or is not and cannot change; perception changes according to the various arguments or reasons for a proposition and the greater or lesser clarity with which these arguments and reasons appear to each person’s mind. Truth does not depend upon our perception of it; and our perception may have no correspondence with truth. Our perception of a given truth may change from ignorance to hypothesis („I suppose"), to opinion („I think"), to probality when we have positive reasons for such an opinion, reasons, however, which do not exclude, in our minds, the reasonable possibility of the contrary being the truth. The H. Father therefore can propose as certain a doctrine, in the field of faith and morals, because he has attained certitude. We may not have the same perception, as I said above, but nonetheless we can rely on his religious competence, his received mission and authority, to submit our intellects with the help of our wills, as explained above (nn. 7-8).
