Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 48. (2000)

LAVERY, Jason: Emperor Maximilian II. and the Danish-Swedish Struggle for Baltic Hegemony 1563–1576

Emperor Maximilian II and the Danish-Swedish Struggle for Baltic Hegemony 1563 - 1576

With the combatants having again made a mockery of the Rostock meeting, the mediators had little choice but to end it. On 30 July, the delegates who remained at Rostock completed a final statement. Any anti-Danish feeling among the mediators that existed since the attack of 11 July had not only disappeared, but also had changed into a decided tilt against Sweden. The document includes a narration of events and the positions taken by the combatants, with the notable omission of Huitfeldt’s attack. The delegates’ criticism of the Swedes centered not around their absence from the meeting, but rather their attacks on Imperial commerce in the Baltic. Special attention was paid to the problems that Lübeck faced in respect to Swedish attacks. As one of the largest and most influential Imperial cities, the German delegations had to consider Lübeck’s stand.40 Obviously, the delegations of Sweden’s enemies exploited their presence in Rostock to make their case against Sweden.

Other important changes in the Empire’s common policy toward Scandinavia took place at the end of July. On 25 July, Emperor Ferdinand died. His son, Maximilian, formally took over the reigns of power that he had actually held for some months.41 Maximilian recalled his ambassadors from Rostock, allowing the two sides to ’’conduct their affairs with and against each other as they saw fit [Ire sacken mit unnd gegen einander wie Sy wüsten ausfiteren]“42 * Until the first half of 1565, Emperor Maximilian’s attention would be focused on a new outbreak of hostilities on the Turkish front.4’

The failure of the Rostock meeting underscores a basic fact about mediation - it only works if the warring parties want it. The Imperial court’s inability to mediate effectively had little to do with the Empire's perceived strength or weakness. Maximilian would have to wait until the combatants tired of fighting before he could effectively intervene. This did not prevent the emperor from trying, however. Too much was at stake.

The Embargo against Sweden and the Problem of Consensus

In assuming the Imperial throne, Maximilian had inherited a strong consensus behind him for his policy toward the Scandinavian conflict. The princes represented at Rostock largely supported the Imperial court’s peace plan. With little of his

40 HHStA, Dänemark 1, Konv. 1564, fols. 141-152\ Rostock, 30 July 1564, final statement of Rostock delegates (or).

41 HHStA, Dänemark 1, Konv. 1564, fols. 140r~v, Vienna, 28 July 1564, Maximilian to Hassenstein (draft).

42 Säch. HStA, Geheimes Archiv, Loc. 8099, Dennemarck contra Schweden fols. 216r-218v, Vienna, 31 July 1564, Maximilian to August (rec. Eppendorf 10 July [ sic] 1564).

4’ Wertheimer, Eduard: Zur Geschichte des Türkenkrieges Maximilians II. 1565 und 1566. In: Archiv für österreichische Geschichte 53 (1875), pp. 43-101.

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