Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 48. (2000)

LAVERY, Jason: Emperor Maximilian II. and the Danish-Swedish Struggle for Baltic Hegemony 1563–1576

Jason Lavery

own leverage over the combatants, Maximilian would be only as strong as the consensus behind him within the Empire.

While the consensus against a Swedish victory remained steady throughout the conflict, the agreement over the means to that end weakened after Maximilian assumed the throne. Lübeck, Frederik II, and Elector August called on the new emperor to introduce a trade embargo against Sweden as a result of the futility of negotiations and a growing Swedish threat to the Empire. In August 1564, a joint Danish-Lübecker delegation traveled to the emperor’s court in Vienna. After stopping to confer with the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, the legation arrived in Vienna on 24 October. In an audience four days later, the Danes and Lübeckers asked the emperor to prohibit trade with Sweden.44 This direct appeal was bolstered by a letter from Elector August that arrived on 31 October. ”So it is true and unavoidable,“ proclaimed the elector, ’’that the king of Sweden is determined to become the only power in the Baltic and to deprive, obstruct, and to his advantage take over and manage alone the free trade and commerce of neighboring realms and the entire Empire.“ August urged the emperor in his capacity as the guardian (Schutz und Schirm) of the Empire to take action for the protection of Lübeck and Holstein by banning trade against Sweden.45 46

On the last day of October, the Imperial Aulic Council (Reichshofrat), the emperor’s chief advisory body, discussed the matter and rejected the calls for an embargo. The council feared that such an action would have a negative economic impact on northern Germany. A ban on trade would represent a clear statement of support by the emperor for Denmark and thus would impair any future attempts by him to mediate. Furthermore, any measures against Sweden without consensus among the Empire’s constituent parts would seriously damage the emperor’s credibility. The council recalled the ineffectiveness of the unilateral sanctions that the Emperor Charles V had imposed against France. As an alternative to a ban on trade, the Reichshofrat advised the emperor to propose to Erik XIV a cease-fire followed by mediation between him and Frederik during the next assembly of the Empire’s constituent parts or Diet (Reichstag).41' Maximilian accepted the council’s advice. The Danes and Lübeckers left Vienna empty handed.47

44 Jensen: Denmarks konflikt, pp. 116-177; Suhm, PF. (ed): Jorgen Rosencrandses til Rosen- holm Levnets Lob, skrevet af ham selv 1590. ln: Dansk Magazin 4 (1750), pp. 193-207; cited here pp. 201-202.

45 HHStA, Staatenabteilung 5, Saxonica, Konv. 1564, fols. 21'-24v, Dresden, 8 Oct. 1564, August to Maximilian (rec. Ina 31 Oct. 1564) (or). „So ist es auch sonsten wahr und unvor-meidlich, das des koniges zu Schweden fumehmen dahin, gerichtet der Ostsee allein mechtigk zu sein unnd die freie handtierungen und commercien den benachbarttenn und dem gantzen Reich zuentziehen, zu sperren, und dieselbige zu seinem vorteil unnd auffnehmenn allein anzustellen.“

46 HHStA, RHR Prot. XVI 23, fols. 181v-185v, 31 Oct. 1564.

47 GSPK, Hauptabt. I, Rep. 50. 25, Fase. 4, unfol., Vienna, 31 Oct. 1564, Maximilian’s Statement to delegation (copy).

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