Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 46. (1998)

GODSEY, William D. Jr.: Officers vs. Diplomats: Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy in Austria-Hungary 1906–1914

William D. Godsey

„irresolute performance“ of Count Mensdorff during the conference to settle issues arising out of the First Balkan War. He particularly despised the way the ambassador frantically clung (kramphaftes Sich Anklammem) to the English point of view during the proceedings.133 Too great a readiness to compromise was a standard reproach levelled by the officers.

Somewhat ironically given the later accounts of Italian statesmen, Lieutenant- Colonel Count Szeptycki in Rome arraigned the local embassy for being under the thumb of the government there.134 135 And in Belgrade, Major Gellinek deplored the conciliatory stance of the envoy toward the Serbian authorities.133

The social hostility and lack of cooperation between the Monarchy’s military and civilian representatives handicapped Conrad above all. Despite his success in increasing the number of officers abroad after the accession of Berchtold, his goal of creating an extensive intelligence network had not been realized. And even that modest achievement he owed the foreign minister, whose cooperation had been essential. In 1914, the Ballhausplatz’s ultimate power over the appointment and recall of military attachés remained as solid as it had been under Aehrenthal. The slight militarization of personnel in the foreign missions reflected a general trend, noted by the historian Manfried Rauchensteiner,136 in the last years before the war in Austria- Hungary. To date we have little evidence that the military exercised a direct and decisive influence on the Monarchy’s foreign policy. Whatever such influence existed may have come about in spite of Conrad’s efforts. One diplomat suggested that General Giesl’s deportment in Belgrade in July 1914, for instance, reflected his background as an officer.137 Giesl, however, was anything but a creature of the Chief of the General Staff and actually owed his transfer into the diplomatic service to Aehrenthal. Only the comparison and analysis of the reports of the attachés and their civilian colleagues may reveal the extent to which the latter were ultimately influenced by the former.

„Und wenn eines dieser Diplomätchen lächelnd zu mir herüberkommt in den Trakt, wo sich die Registratur - der Raum, den man mir gnadenweise als Kanzlei zuwies - befindet, mit einem Stück in der müden Hand, das wochenlang drüben bei den Staatsmännchen - mit ihnen - geschlafen hat, bevor dieser Bismarckembryo, aus dem aber höchstens ein Aerenthal [sic!] wird, darauf kommt, dass es auch mich interessieren könnte, wenn er die armselige Dürftigkeit dieses heimlichen Raumes, in dem ein Theil meiner Bücher wochenlang am Boden herumlag, weil kein Kasten für mich geräumt war, die zwei Sessel und meine schreibmaschinbeschmutzten Hände mit seinem 20jährigen schlaffen Blick ironisch streift, so weiss ich, dass er in diesem Augenblick von Neuem den ganzen, grossen Unterschied erfasst, den der Staat, der ja ausschliesslich für die Diplomaten da ist, zwischen einem solchen und einem Offizier macht.“

133 KA, Nachlaß Conrad B/1450: 83: Horváth to Conrad, March 28, 1913.

134 Ibidem: Szeptycki to Conrad, April 27, 1913. For the Italian view, seeAldrovandi Marescotti, Luigi Graf: Der Krieg der Diplomaten. Erinnerungen und Tagebuchauszüge 1914-1919. Translated by Eugen Dollmann. München: Hugendubel, 1940, p. 50-55.

135 KA, Nachlaß Conrad, B/1450: 81: Gellinek to Conrad, February 6, 1913.

136 Rauchensteiner, Manffied: Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg. Graz-Wien-Köln: Styria 1993.

137 Lützow, Heinrich Graf von: Im diplomatischen Dienst der Monarchie, ed. Peter Hohenbalken. Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1971, p. 226-27.

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