Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955

into NATO and other manifestations of strength-the Soviets had effected a complete alteration of their policy. Their policy had been hard and was becoming soft. The Iron Curtain is going to disappear. In the future there will be no more sharp line between the free world and the Soviet bloc. The sharp line will be replaced by a fuzzy area94 95).

With hindsight we can tell that Dulles was decidedly too optimistic. The Iron Curtain certainly did not disappear as the Hungarian uprising of 1956 showed.

The transformation of an occupied Austria into an independent and neutral nation also worried some of its neighbors. In Germany, Adenauer was concerned about the frequently expressed sentiment: „If Raab, why not Adenauer? if Austria, why not Germany?“93) Many wondered, along with the opposition Social Democratic Party, whether the reunification of Germany might have been achieved with an offer to stay out of alliances96). But Adenauer and Dulles made it clear that Germany and Austria were two very different cases97). Like the Pentagon, the security obsessed Swiss worried about the „strategic vacuum“ created on their borders by the neutral Austria98). The Italians also pondered the impact of Austrian neutrality on their defense plans. The most drastic anxieties were expressed by the Italian Defense Minister Taviani:

In war, if her [Austria’s] neutrality were respected this would be to our advantage. If it were violated, we should of course lose Vienna but we could save the mountain provinces by blocking the valleys with atomic bombs. The Austrians could help at least with ’partisan’

94) Discussion of the 254th NSC-Meeting, 19 May 1955, Box 7, NSC-Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library. Dulles also made the argument of Soviet concessions as a result of Western toughness before a national TV audience on May 17, for text see Department of State Bulletin (30 May 1955) 871-76. See also Rupieper Deutsche Frage und europäische Sicherheit: Politisch-strategische Überlegungen 1953/1955 in Thoss/Volkmann 194-95.

95) Stearman Soviet Union 165.

96) When Raab was still in Moscow, the CDU leader Wilhelm Krone warned the U.S. High Commissioner James B. Conant that a successful Austrian neutralization „would tend create impression here that SPD program calling for alliance free status for Germany had been correct and that Government had been deluded by Western tactics designed primarily to get German soldiers [emphasis Conant],“ Conant to Dulles, 14 April 1955, NA, RG 863.001/4-1455, Box 2662. For an analysis of the chances of German reunification, see Rupieper Deutsche Frage.

97) In a speech in Goslar on April 22, and other speeches of this time, Chancellor Adenauer insisted that Austria and Germany were two very different cases, Adenauer Speeches, Adenauer Foundation, Rhöndorf.

98) Stearman, Soviet Union 163.

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