Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
Günter Bischof warfare. But more important to Taviani’s mind, a violation of Austria’s neutrality would mean the end of that of Switzerland"). One wonders how many atomic bombs dropped on Austria it would have taken to „save“ Italy? Y. The recently opened diplomatic records in London and Washington show Raab’s diplomacy from 1953 to 1955 is even more remarkable when we take the extent of Western scepticism over both Austrian neutrality and Austro-Soviet bilateral negotiations into account. Oliver Ra- thkolb is correct in pointing out that the Austrian insistence on the neutral option after 1953 was a „Verhandlungselement“ in the State Treaty negotiations that was „forced“ upon the U.S. government99 100). But we have to add in fairness to the Western statesmen that they realized one basic fact early on: self-chosen Austrian neutrality could ultimately not be resisted, if the Austrians and their government were willing to pay that price for getting rid of the occupation regime. The Western powers stipulated, however, that a military vacuum would be unaccep- table-it would have to be armed neutrality. The Austria’s successful pursuit of a neutral status, regardless of Anglo- American objections, provides us with an important lesson in diplomacy. Small nations can conduct their own foreign policy goals in the face of larger powers that „supposedly“ set international agendas. This fact is often overlooked by traditional Cold War scholarship, which concentrates on U.S.-Soviet relations and seldom bothers to test their theories on smaller countries as actors on the international scene. Raab’s early foreign policy is an instructive case in point here. Eleanor Dulles’ condescending characterization of Raab’s „He is more or less a farmer and likes to climb mountains. He is a simple person“-is probably not uncharacteristic for Western views of the Chancellor101). The lack of regard 99) Conversation with Taviani mentioned in letter A. Ross (Rome) to J.G. Ward (Foreign Office), 23 May 1955, PRO, FO 371/117801/RR 1071/441. 100) Rathkolb Von der Besatzung zur Neutralität 396. 101) Eleanor Dulles, who had spent three years in Vienna (1945—1948) was her brother’s „Austrian expert.“ This citation is part of a conversation when John Foster asked her for ideas for a toast during Raab’s visit to Washington in the fall of 1954, telephone call Mrs. Eleanor Dulles, 23 November 1954, Folder „General November 1, 1954 - December 31, 1954 (4),“ Box 3, Telephone Calls Series, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library. Wallinger noted Raab’s „international inexperience,“ see 66, Wallinger to Foreign Office, 29 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117787/RR 1071/84. Caccia advised the Foreign Office that taking Raab to Ascot to the horse races during the Chancellor’s visit to England, was not at all his „cup of tea.“ Raab „has probably never been to a race-meeting in his life,“ so it 392
