Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
Günter Bischof indicated a greater degree of weakness. In any event, it constituted the first substantial Soviet concession to the West in Europe since the end of the war. Furthermore, the Soviet move would entail very considerable risks for the Soviet position in the European satellites90). For the Pentagon events in Austria were progressing too rapidly for basic security reassessments, but John Foster Dulles demanded and got the authority to negotiate an Austrian Treaty. President Eisenhower added as a „final thought“ that „the Soviet gambit on Austria was definitely made with Germany in mind as the real target“91). After eight years of stalling and procrastinating in Austrian Treaty negotiations, in the spring of 1955 progress was suddenly not rapid enough for the Kremlin. They were probably cutting their losses. From May 2 to May 13, an „ambassadors’ conference“ put the final touches to the long text of the Austrian Treaty. On May 14, the four foreign Ministers met in Vienna to add their final agreement to the text; the next day they put their signatures under it in the Belvedere Palace92). In October 1955, the Austrian Parliament put the law into effect that declared Austria a neutral nation, after the occupation forces had evacuated the country. Thus the Austrian Treaty was signed in spite of Germany’s integration into NATO and the formation of the Warsaw Pact. Dulles was present when the ratification instruments of the Paris Agreements were deposited in Bonn on May 5. From Bonn he had gone on to Paris to attend the first NATO meeting with the Germans as members. From there Dulles, Pinay and Macmillan Hew on the Vienna to conclude one of the most memorable weeks in their careers93). The dire predictions of the Western diplomats in March an April had not come to pass. The Kremlin obviously had strategic, political and economic reasons to sign the Austrian Treaty, in spite of the ratification of the Paris Agreements. John Foster Dulles, after his return from Vienna, argued that the diplomatic succeses in Germany and Austria was a result of the Western policy of toughness in the wake of Stalin’s death. He reported to the National Security Council on May 19: It had been quite apparent to him, as a result of the achievements of the United States and its allies-including the bringing of Germany 90) Discussion at the 245th NSC-Meeting, 21 April 1955, Box 6, NSC-Series, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 91) Ibid. 92) Stourzh Staatsvertrag 165-68. 93) „An Historic Week,“ Department of State Bulletin (30 May 1955) 871-76. Macmillan thought the signing of the Austrian Treaty was „one of the most extraordinary episodes in post-war diplomacy,“ see Alistair Horne Macmillan, 1894-1956 (London 1988) 360. 390
