Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955

the treaty and an end to the occupation. And neutrality would not be written into the Treaty. The Soviets also granted major concessions in the economic sphere85).

The Austrian delegation regularly briefed the Western ambassadors in Moscow. On April 13, Figl informed them about Molotov’s clarification that Swiss neutrality should be the model for Austria86). William Hayter, the British ambassador, and Bohlen did not trust BischofPs briefings. On April 14, Hayter cabled back to London that Bischoff „was in a mood unusually confused and odd, even for him“87). But on April 15 Figl and Kreisky erased the „unpleasant impression“ of the previous day and gave a detailed briefing of the economic concessions made by the Soviets and the main points of the Moscow „aide mémoire“ (Moscow Memorandum) agreed to between Moscow and Vienna88). Wallinger in Vienna could not believe his eyes when he saw the joint Moscow communiqué, which he felt „to be to good to be true“89). Wallinger had always been suspicious of bilateral Austrio-soviet negotiations.

The importance of the Soviet moves in Austria was once again discussed in the National Security Council. Allen Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency noted in his overview of „significant world de- velopements affecting U.S. security“:

With respect to the move on the Austrian State Treaty, Mr. Dulles expressed the belief that the Soviet offer to Austria was not merely a bluff, but that the Soviet Union would sign a treaty with Austria at the earliest possible moment. He described this Soviet move vis-a-vis Austria as the most significant action since the end of World War II. It certainly indicated a greater flexbility in Soviet policy, and it perhaps

85) For an excellent summary of the Moscow trip and the Austro-Soviet negotiations with the Kremlin leadership, which resulted in the Moscow Memorandum, see Stourzh Staatsvertrag 142-63.

86) 352, Hayter to Foreign Office, 13 April 1955, PRO, FO 371/117789/RR 1071/128.

87) 353, Hayter to Foreign Office, 14 April, PRO, FO 371/117789/RR 1071/129. Bohlen also thought that Bischoff was particularly vague on neutrality during the April 14 briefing, 1808, Bohlen to Secretary of State, 14 April 1955, NA, RG 59, 663.001/4-1455, Box 2662. A year earlier, Hayter had called Bischoff a „fairly idiotic character,“ who had been in Moscow far too long, see „confidential“ letter Hayter to Roberts, 16 March 1954, PRO, FO 371/109350/CA 10318/3. Hayter considered Bischoff a „fellow traveller,“ Personal interview with Sir William Hayter, March 1986, Oxford.

88) 357, Hayter to Foreign Office, 15 April 1955, PRO, FO 371/117789/RR 1071/133. The Western powers only received the full text of the Moscow Memorandum on April 29, see 119, Wallinger to Foreign Office, 29 April 1955, PRO, FO 371/117792/RR1071/232. This immediately raised serious issues over the German assets (oil assets) in the Soviet zone, agreed to at Moscow, which the Austrian government could not give to foreign nationals, on this issue see Stourzh Staatsvertrag 164-56.

89) 83, Wallinger to Foreign Office, 15 April 1955, PRO, FO 371/117789/RR 1071/131.

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