Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
Günter Bischof they tried to curb the negotiating powers of the Austrians80). In addition the British ambassador reminded Raab that his visit should be made „purely as a fact-finding mission.“ The Austrian delegation was reminded that they should not „get down to the drafting of formulae“81). Harrison feared that the Austrians might be tempted „to slip from one concession to another“ without any Soviet quid pro quo. He warned Schwarzenberg that „one never earned any gratitude by making unrequited concessions to the Russians; they merely pocketed the concessions and asked for more.“ Anthony Eden, who was nonplussed by the rapid developments on Austria, minuted on Harrison’s report: „I am sorry that [the] Austrians were not more firmly warned against Moscow’s wiles. I hope we shall not wake up one morning soon & find Raab in Moscow“82). Ambassador Wallinger even suspected that the Austrians were prepared to trade „military neutralisation“ against the conclusion of a Treaty83). A few days later Wallinger reported to London that „the Chancellor is well aware of our qualms and doubts; but I think that this awareness colours his thinking for he is quite convinced that we mean well by his country.“ But the British Ambassador had to admit that „in the end [Raab] considers himself the best judge of what Austria needs and can afford to give for it“84). British confidence in the diplomatic skills of Metternich’s epigones on the Ballhausplatz was not very high. It must have been a rude awakening for Eden two weeks later. And, of course, the Austrians went far beyond „fact finding“ and drafted a number of „formulae“ in the decisive negotiating rounds in Moscow from April 12 to 15. Austrian armed neutrality according to the Swiss model proved to be the deus ex machina to finally get the Soviet signature for 80) Tripartite Statement in Foreign Office to Vienna, 4 April 1955, PRO, FO 371/117788/RR 1071/99. A Tripartite Working Group consisting of Harrison and Young from the Southern Department of the Foreign Office , Crouy-Chanel from the French Embassy, and Chipman and Rutter from the US Embassy, agreed on the text of Austrian declaration on April 1, see 4349, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State, 1 April 1955, NA, RG 59, 663.001/4-155, Box 2662. The was communicated to the Austrian government on April 5 and released to the press the next day, 4354, Aldrich to Secretary of State, 1 April 1955, NA, RG 59, 663.001/4-155, Box 2662. On the the intricate Western diplomacy that lay behind the formulation of this statement see also the files in PRO, FO 371/117788, and NA, RG 59, Box 2662. 81) 86, Foreign Office to Vienna, 2 April 1955, PRO, FO 371/117788/RR 1071/95. 82) Eden’s handwritten note on Harrison’s March 24 record of conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, 25 March 1955, PRO, FO 571/117787/RR 1071/74. 83) Wallinger to Harrison, 30 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117788/RR 1071/104. 84) Wallinger added: „It follows that if the Russians are at all coulants in Moscow, we may yet find ourselves faced with problems of Raab’s creation,“ see the four-page „secret“ dispatch Wallinger to Harrison, 6 April 1955, PRO, FO 371/117789/RR 1071/130. 388
