Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

ambitions to be the man who got the Russians out of Austria and believes that even if he has to pay too high a price, he can later renege on his agreements77).

Thompson also worried that the German problem might be the Soviets’ primary objective. Moscow „may well hope that the quick conclusion of an Austrian Treaty followed by a generous use of the carrot and stick in Germany, they can prevent German rearmament by influencing the Germans themselves“78).

„Chip“ Bohlen, the Soviet expert and U.S. ambassador in Moscow, did not agree with Thompson. Bohlen argued that the „course of Soviet European policy, at least since 1949 if not before, has been little more than [a] continuing and basically unsuccessful attempt to prevent consolidation and growth of strength, especially military, in Western Europe.“ Their opposition to the Marshall Plan, NATO and German rearmament had resulted from their desire to forestall disadvantageous military moves by the West. In the case of the Austrian and German questions, argued Bohlen, the Soviet were „acting defensively... in response to recent developments in Western Europe, particularly the adoption of the Paris agreements“79). Even Washington’s best Kremlin watchers could not agree whether political, economic, or military inspired the Soviet motives in their moves on the Austrian question.

All Western experts were understandably much more worried about wrapping up the ratification process that would integrate West Germany into NATO; the resolution of the Austrian Treaty and the termination of the Austrian occupation could wait a while longer. But the Austrian government had different priorities. It wanted to end the interminable occupation, which required the conclusion of the Treaty. If that required bilateral talks, the Austrians did not hesitate to go into the lion’s den to parley.

In the days before the visit of Raab’s delegation to Moscow, the Western powers tried to limit the damage that might be done by such a visit. In a tripartite statement delivered before Raab went to Moscow,

The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955

77) 2201, Thompson to Secretary of state, 2 April 1955, NA, RG 59, 663.001/4-255, Box 2662.

78) 2206, Thompson to Secretary of State, 4 April 1955, NA, RG 59, 663.001/4-455, Box 2662. Thompson speculated on Soviet motives that their „objective in seeking neutralization is one of seeking political and economic advantages rather than negaitively preventing military disadvantages.“

79) 1751, Bohlen to Scretary of State, 8 April 1955, NA, RG 59, 863.001/4-855, Box 2662.

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