Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
Günter Bischof rican „forward strategy“ in Europe. The Americans „would have liked Austria, after the Treaty, to join the western military club,“ noted Harrison. He concluded: „We have doubted the practicability of this both on military and political grounds. But we had hoped they might join our political clubs.“ Now it looked as if they might join neither72). And Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, minuted in the margin: „I am concerned at the possibility of Raab going to Moscow. He should be warned against it“73). American worries differed little from British ones. The U. S. government was hardly excited about Raab’s invitation to Moscow. At the beginning of March Dulles suspected that „the Russians may have cooked something up acceptable to the Austrians but not to us“74). Dulles agreed that Moscow was a „dangerous place to go [t]o alone.“ He cautioned Ambassador Gruber in Washington to remind Raab that he should not think he could go to Moscow and speak for the Western powers. More importantly, Soviet „guarantees“ were a problem, since they used them as an „excuse to intervene in internal affairs“ of other nations. Dulles told Gruber that he realized the invitation to Moscow had to be accepted. But Raab should use the word „neutrality“ as little as possible when dealing with the Kremlin75). Before the Austrian delegation flew to Moscow, Foreign Minister Figl reassured the U.S. government that the Austrians would make „no commitments or promises at Moscow“76). The U.S. had Llewelyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen, their premier Soviet experts, as ambassadors in Vienna and Moscow. But they disagreed over possible motives for recent Soviet actions on the Austrian Treaty. Thompson was worried about Raab’s probable reasoning: I understand that he believes if Austria does not achieve treaty on this round she will probably end up by being partitioned... Raab also has 72) Harrison memorandum „Austria,“ 23 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117787/R 1071/72. 73) Eden handwritten note, 25 March 1955, ibid.. 74) Telephone conversation Dulles-Hagerty, 7 March 1955, quoted in Mastny Kremlin Politics 47. 75) After a talk with Dulles, Ambassador Gruber summarized American views for the British Embassy in Washington, see Makins (Washington) to Foreign Office, 26 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117787/RR 1071/67. See also Raab’s conslutations with his ambassadors in Vienna, 28 March 1955, in Österreich und die Grossmächte, ed. by Schilcher 250- 64. Personal letter Gruber to Raab, 25 March 1955, Julius Raab Papers. I am grateful to Dr. Gottfried Heindl of giving me some copies of the private Raab-Gruber correspondence. 76) Figl’s promise to U.S. Ambassador Thompson came after Raab’s conference with his ambassadors in the four capitals, 2191, Thompson to Secretary of State, 1 April 1955, National Archives [.VI], Record Group [7?G] 59, 663.001/4-155, Box 2662. 386
