Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

war era, had become a liability for Raab’s new approach of being equally close to both East and West27).

When Gruber’s Indian initiative transpired, the Western powers lost much of their trust in Gruber. They felt Gruber had broken the basic law of consulting them before he opened negotiations with the Soviets. Geoffrey Harrison, whose experience on Austrian affairs went back to the drafting of the important Moscow Declaration in 1943, complained that Gruber „effectively sold the pass to the Russians as regards both the long draft Treaty and Austrian neutrality.“ Gruber’s recent „equivocal manoeuvres“ had „virtually undermined“ the Western bargaining position28). After such Austrian initiatives, the Western powers „would no longer be allowed by public opinion to resist an Austro-Russian front on these questions“29). Llewelyn Thompson, the U.S. Ambassador in Vienna, criticized Gruber’s „somewhat cynical concept of integrity in the conduct of foreign relations“ and his „tendency to the use of questionable tactics.“30) The Rritish were prescient; the very „Austro-Russian front“ which they feared in 1953, eventually materialized in the spring of 1955. The Western powers found it difficult to voice public criticism or throw up diplomatic roadblocks at a time when eight years of patient treaty negotiations seemed to be coming to successful fruition.

But Western suspicions of linking the option of „Austrian neutrality“ to treaty negotiations went deeper than this. The Western powers worried most about the effects a a military „neutralization“ of Austria on Adenauer’s Germany. From 1953-1955, the integration of the Federal Republic into the Western defense system was at the top of the foreign policy agenda in London and Washington. It is not surprising that the French

The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955

27) Personal interview, Alfred Maleta, Vienna, 27 May 1986.

28) Harrison minute (and Warner minutes). 1 July 1955, PRO, FO 371/103765/CA 1071/169; see also Harrison record of conversation with the Austrian ambassador Wimmer, 6 July 1953, CA 1071/175 and No. 250, Foreign Office to Vienna, 7 July 1953, CA 1071/166; No. 494, Gascoigne (Moscow) to Foreign Office, 6 July 1953. CA 1071/167. When Harrison informed the U.S. Embassy in London of the recent „Gruberism,“ he found the Americans ignorant of what „Gruber had been up to both in Moscow and with the Indians,“ Harrison minute, 3 July 1953, CA 1971/168.

29) Harrison minute, 3 July 1953, PRO, FO 371/103763/CA 1071/168.

30) But Thompson had to admit that Gruber’s basic policies were those of both parties in the Austrian government coalition, see Thompson to Department of State, 8 October 1953, FRUS, 1952-19)4, Vol. VII, Part 2 [herafter cited as VII/2], 1907. Bruno Kreisky has recently lauded Thompson’s diplomatic skills: „... Thompson ... war wahrscheinlich der beste Unterhändler mit Moskau, den der Westen jemals hatte ... [und] war sicher der bedeutenste amerikanische Diplomat, dem ich begegnet bin,“ see Im Strom der Politik: Der Memoiren zweiter Teil (Vienna 1988) 72.

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