Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

Günter Bischof

feared the „damaging repercussions“ of a neutralization of Austria on Germany31).

All attempts to start a new round of high level diplomacy on the Austrian Treaty and other unresolved Cold War issues failed however after Stalin’s death in 1953. Resumption of Austrian Treaty talks was used as a bargaining chip. After the final meeting on 9. February 1953, the Soviets refused to resume discussions in the forum of the Deputies for the Austrian Treaty. The Soviets declined to negotiate on the basis of the American Abbreviated Treaty draft of 195232). In his famous „Chance for Peace“ speech of April 14, President Eisenhower called upon the Soviets to back up their sincerity for peace with „deeds;“ signing the Austrian Treaty would be such a deed33). Churchill’s repeated April and May calls for a summit with the Soviets, in which the Korean and the Austrian issues could be settled, were resisted by Eisenhower, Eden and many in the British and American governments. A „solitary pilgrimage“ by Churchill, without a clear agenda, would only threaten Western bargaining positions and relations with the Allies34).

Not all was gloom and doom however. Austria was not Germany. In May, the Foreign Office showed concern about rumors of a „neutralisation of Austria;“ but the British diplomats still argued for keeping the German and the Austrian questions apart:

We can be sure that anything discussed or agreed in the Austrian connexion would be sued as an argument by the Russians in the German connexion. But it does not by any means follow that what goes for Austria goes for Germany. We could not agree to Germany’s neutralisation without a reversal of Western policy... [W]hile the

31) Harrison memorandum of conversation with the French Minister Crouy-Chanel, 12 May 1953, PRO, FO 371/103762/CA 1071/ 123.

32) See, for example, Warner memorandum „Soviet Notes on Austria,“ 4 August 1953, PRO, FO 371/103764/CA 1071/201, and „Austrian Teaty,“ 31 August 1953, PRO, FO 371/ 103766/CA 1071/246. For the 260th meeting of the Deputies, see Stourzh Staatsvertrag 76. The National Security had allowed Dulles to drop the Short Treaty Draft at the end of April. Negotiations with the Soviets on the Austrian Treaty ran the argument in the NSC, could „stave of a Russian initiative for a Foreign Ministers meeting on the German problem,“ Discussions of the 140th NSC-Meeting, 22 April 1953, Box 4, NSC-Series, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. But since the U.S. would not publicly reject the Short Draft Treaty, the Soviets refused to resume Deputy negotiations.

33) Ambrose Eisenhower II 94; for disagreements within the Eisenhower administration over how to respond to the conciliatory Soviet gestures after Stalin’s death, see Larson Crisis Prevention 35-39.

34) Gilbert Never Despair 827-45 (on Austria 830); Robert Rhodes James Anthony Eden (London 1986) 365; Anthony Seldon Churchill’s Indian Summer: The Conservative Government 1951-55 (London 1981) 396-401.

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