Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
Isolating the Isolator 173 What Cartwright wished to achieve as a result of convincing Austria that she really was strong enough to work out her destinies for herself was a belief on the part of the German government ‘that in spite of the Triple Alliance Austria’s fidelity could no more be depended upon in the event of a crisis — brought on by them - than that of Italy’. The cause of peace, so served, would be for the benefit of all, and would return Europe to a Golden Age. The league of peace of the status quo Powers would admit Germany to its ranks, provided she manifested a real desire to be satisfied with her present position in the world. This would make possible a practical solution of the related problems of armaments and expenditure. This programme received a mixed reception at the Foreign Office. One official, Collier, thought the proposed policy ‘fraught with considerable danger’: deprived of her allies Germany might run amok and ‘risk everything in defence of her honour, dragging Europe into what would be the most terrible war in all history’. Even the more moderate Langley believed that any British overtures to Austria, following so closely on the establishment of good Anglo-Russian relations, would produce an unwelcome reaction. Grey himself appeared to wish to have it both ways: ‘It is quite true . . . that an attempt to isolate Germany by setting Austria against her might precipitate a conflict. On the other hand it is also true that if Germany dominated Europe the result would also be war. We have to steer between these two dangers. At present there is a fair equilibrium and we should not try to make a breach between Germany and Austria. But Austria should not be too servile to Germany; at any rate not to the extent of going out of her way to oppose us in such matters as Macedonian Reform',6). Cartwright’s ideas on British policy and the role of Austria produced no reconsideration of his appointment as Ambassador at Vienna. This became official on 1 November 1908, a matter of days after the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the end of the existing Austro-Russian entente had created circumstances apparently much less conductive to the implementation of his ideas than those prevailing when he had first expressed them16 17). In Vienna, Cartwright quickly gained the distinct impression that the Germans, and in particular the German Embassy, occupied by the detested von Tschirschky, afraid that Anglo-Austrian relations might improve, were doing their best to create a breach between these two countries. This was the theme of letters to Grey and Tyrrell in the last week of the year18). Grey cautioned his ambassador against indulging himself. He had, he wrote, just told Mensdorff in London that he ‘had carefully abstained from any attempt on any occasion to make mischief between Germany and Austria. Had I ever tried to do so, we would have been exposed to the 16) See appendix no. 1 p. 186. 17) See Francis Roy Bridge Isvolsky, Aehrenthal and the end of the Austro- Russian Entente, 1906-8 in MÖStA 29 (1976) 315-62. 1S) Cartwright MSS: Cartwright to Grey 24 December, to Tyrrell 28 December, to his father 29 December 1908.
