Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
174 Keith Wilson charge of attempting to isolate Germany — a charge often made but for which there was no justification. The balance of power in Europe was preserved by the present grouping, and I should not think of wishing to disturb it’19). Tyrrell was rather more encouraging. He agreed that Berlin was seeking further estrangement between Austria and Russia, wanting friction to produce similar estrangement between Britain and Austria, and, ‘most important of all, the consequent further dependence of Vienna upon Berlin’20). Cartwright went on to speculate that Aehrenthal might, like the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, be a ‘greater Austrian’, ‘which carries with it the idea of Austria-Hungary’s independence of action in international politics’21). By the time he sent in his Annual Report, at the beginning of February, he was convinced that Aehrenthal’s main desire was to be reconciled with Russia, and that the Austrian Foreign Minister saw the way to this end through being on good terms with Britain and France22). He had, moreover, found an ally in the French Ambassador in Vienna, Crozier, who, he told Hardinge privately, thought the moment propitious for drawing away Austria-Hungary from Germany and for stabilising the Triple Alliance23). Crozier’s views were embodied in a despatch which reached London on 8 February. Crozier’s Aehrenthal had not only completely altered his attitude towards Great Britain since Cartwright’s arrival in Vienna; he also regarded Britain as the key to Austro-Italian and Austro-Turkish relations. Something on which Crozier and Cartwright were agreed was that Aehrenthal was ‘resolved to do his utmost to give Austro-Hungarian foreign policy an independent colour of its own’. In order to ward off the Russian danger which drove Austria towards Germany, it was ‘absolutely necessary for Austria-Hungary to come to an understanding with Paris and London’. According to Cartwright, the French were ready to receive the Austrian advances ‘with open arms’: their doubt was that the British would be equally willing to do so24). Hardinge, who took Crozier at face value, described him as ‘very foolish if he is trying to weaken the Triple Alliance. It is so weak that there would be the danger of its falling through altogether if it grew weaker. It is now just what we want, and any change either way would be for the worse’25); he did not trouble to minute the despatch. It was left to Spicer to conjure up the ‘very dangerous situation’ that would follow if Austria did cement her relations with the Entente Powers: ‘for if Germany is deserted by the only ally on whom she feels able to depend, she will be quite certain to regard this as the final link in the “Einkreisung” policy of Great Britain, and may then be seriously tempted to resort to the fortunes of war to burst through the iron ring encircling 19) Ibid.: Grey to Cartwright 6 January 1909. 20) Ibid.: Tyrrell to Cartwright 12 January 1909. 21) Ibid.: Cartwright to Grey 21 January 1909. 22) Ibid.: Cartwright to Crowe 3 February 1909. 23) Ibid.: Cartwright to Hardinge 4 February 1909. 24) See appendix no. 2 p. 187. 25) Cartwright MSS: Hardinge to Cartwright 8 February 1909.
