Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 21. (1968)
MIYAKE, Masaki: Die Achse Berlin – Rom – Tokio im Spiegel der japanischen Quellen
Die Achse Berlin-Rom-Tokio im Spiegel der japanischen Quellen 439 TRIPARTITE PACT 6») 10. I shall next proceed to testify on the events leading up to the signing of the Tripartite Pact, as I understood them. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was in complete charge of all negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty, and my paricipation was merely in capacity as War Minister. The decision as to national policy, as previously described, was related to the two major basic national policies of the Second KONOYE Cabinet. That is to say, the conclusion of the treaty falls under that section of the „Outline of the Basic National Policy“ which stipulated that in formulating Japan’s foreign policy attention will be focussed upon a successful settlement of the China affair, while constructive and flexible measures will be adopted (R. 6273) * 70) and para. 4 of the „Gist of Main Points“ which specifies the strengthening of political ties with Germany and Italy. (R. 11,795) 71) The true motive for strengthening the political ties with Germany and Italy is as testified by me under sub-heading (a) of paragraph 9 of this affidavit72). Discussions concerning this move had been going on privately before the establishment of the Second KONOYE Cabinet, and it began to assume tangible form with the arrival of Herr Heinrich Stahmer sometime following the inauguration of that cabinet. It must be added that there was opposition to the proposition. Navy Minister Yoshida resigned because of poor health but it *#) Die Aussage Tőjós in dem Kapitel über den Dreimächtepakt kann trotz der sehr starken Tendenz zur Selbstverteidigung, die der gesamten Darstellung Tó jós in diesem Affidavit von ihm unverkennbar zum Ausdruck kommt, als relativ nüchtern angesehen werden. Es ist deswegen, weil Tojó an der direkten Entstehung des Dreimächtepaktes unter dem zweiten Konoye-Kabinett keinen wesentlichen Anteil hat. Der Kriegsminister Tojó verhielt sich, wenigstens am Anfang seiner Amtsperiode, im Hinblick auf die Außenpolitik zurückhaltend. Der Unwille des Kaisers über den Rücktritt Hatas, seines Amtsvorgängers, der zum Zusammenbruch des Kabinetts Yonai führte (meine Darstellung II. (A)), wirkte für Tojó einigermaßen bindend. Bemerkenswert ist die Tatsache, daß Tojó, obwohl er keineswegs in freundlichem Verhältnis zu Matsuoka stand und erheblich zu dessen Sturz beitrug, Matsuokas These in seiner Aussage ohne Einwände einfach wiederholt, daß der Dreimächtepakt dem Krieg mit Amerika Vorbeugen und die Beziehungen Japans zur Sowjetunion verbessern könnte. 70) R. bedeutet Record in dem IMTFE. Der Originaltext mit dem Originaltitel: „Kihon Kokusaku Yökö“, steht in dem Sonderband für Quelleneditation von Tsunoda u. a., S. 320—322. 71) Originaltitel: „Sekai Jóséi no Suii ni tomonau Jikyoku Shori Yókő“, Originaltext in Tsunoda u. a., S. 322—325. 72) In dem unter (a) genannten Paragraph 9 steht folgendes: Relations with Germany and Italy. Viewed from the aspects relative to the solution of the China Incident and changes in the international situation, there was an urgent necessity to extricate Japan from world isolation and place her in an impregnable position. It was reasoned that in view of the consistent attitude taken by America and Britain throughout the China Incident, that Japan should make some attempt to join hands with Germany and Italy, and arrive also at an understanding with the Sowjetunion without regard to the previous course of events. At that stage there was no thought of proceeding to the extent of a tripartite treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy but merely to aim at a closer political connection with those two countries. There was some argument also favoring a drastic improvement in the relations with the Sowjet Union.
