Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 21. (1968)
MIYAKE, Masaki: Die Achse Berlin – Rom – Tokio im Spiegel der japanischen Quellen
440 Masaki Miyake cannot be said that that was the only reason73). On 4 September a four Minister Conference was held at the official residence of the Prime Minister with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Vice Minister of Navy, acting for the Navy Minister, and myself attending. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA submitted for discussion, without previous notice74 75 *), the subject of strengthening the Japan—German—Italy axis, and proposed that the three powers should cooperate mutually towards the objective of establishing a new order in Europe and Asia, and that they should confer with each other as soon as possible as to the best method of accomplishing this end and make it known to the public at large. The Conference agreed to approve the proposal. Herr Stahmer conferred with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on 9 and 10 September. I am not fully conversant with the details of the negotiations at that time, but these led to the Liaison Conference and the Imperial Conference of 19 September 1940. (I wish to state at this point that in the evidence presented by the Prosecution there are documents which refer to a Privy Council Meeting and an Imperial Conference on 16 September (Ex. No. 551), but no such meetings were held at that date. I also do not recall any Four Minister Conference on 1 August73)). At the Liaison Conference of 19 September, the agreement reached at the Four Minister Conference on 4 September was confirmed. Concerning this Liaison Conference, there are four points which remain in my recollection 7e). The first point was, whether the Three Power relations should take the form of a treaty or a joint declaration of agreement of principles. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was opposed to the form of a joint declaration. The second point was, what effect would relations with Germany and Italy have on Japanese-American relations. Mr. MATSUOKA explained that Germany did not desire American entry into the war, but hoped to avert a clash between America and Japan, and was willing to offer her cooperation to that end. The third point concerned the military position of Japan in the event America entered the war. Mr. MATSUOKA’s explanation on this point was that there were a substantial number of Americans of German and Italian descent who could influence public opinion, and, thus, there was a possibility that American entry into the war might be prevented. However, he wished to 73) Die wahren Gründe, die zum Rücktritt des Marineministers Zengő Yo- shida führten, sind umstritten. Meistens wird behauptet, er habe seinen Widerstand gegen den Abschluß des Dreimächtepaktes nicht mehr durchsetzen können und sei deshalb zurückgetreten. Er selbst gab am 30. 1. 1948 einen Brief an den Verfasser der Konoye-Biographie, Teiji Yabe, daß sein Rücktritt aus gesundheitlichen Gründen erfolge und Tőjős Behauptung vor dem Tokioter Militärgerichtshof unbegründet sei. Yoshida sprach später persönlich mit Yabe und sagte, die Marine sowie die Armee seien von dem Vorschlag Matsuokas zum Dreimächtepakt auf der Vier-Ministerkonferenz am 4. September 1940 völlig überrascht worden, und daß die Marine bis zu diesem Datum, an dem der stellvertretende Marineminister Sumiyama den kranken Yoshida vertrat, an ein Dreimächtebündnis noch nie gedacht hätte (Yabe, a. a. O., Bd. 2, S. 151). 74) Der Ausdruck Tőjős: „without previous notice“ hat im Zusammenhang mit der in der Anm. 73 angegebenen Lage eine unverkennbare Bedeutung. 75) Diese Aussage Tőjős ist richtig. 7e) Die Nachschrift über diese Verbindungskonferenz am 19. 9. 1940 ist in den oben erwähnten japanischen Aktensammlungen nicht zu finden.
