Magyar Egyház, 1981 (60. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1981-03-01 / 3-4. szám
MflgyflK ecyftffT 15. oldal Why Are Churces Declining? i The recent downturns in membership in many denominations are unprecedented in American history, indicating that something basic is happening in the churches and American society. The trends are similar in the various mainline denominations, although the extent of the downturn varies from a 19 percent decline in the United Presbyterian Church (1965 to 1975) to no decline at all. But even those denominations which have not declined have leveled off after decades of membership growth and are now merely holding their own. The trends in any one denomination are not credibly explained by events peculiar to that denomination, such as the Angela Davis dispute in the United Presbyterian Church or the tussle over the new Prayer Book in the Episcopal Church. Such specific events are at best minor explanations. The major explanations for the trends must be common to all the middle class Protestant denominations. The trend lines are quite steady, indicating that underlying forces are causing them, not specific historical events or policy decisions. Three commonly-voiced theories found little or no support from our analysis. First is the “roll-cleaning theory,” which proposes that the reported downturn in membership in certain denominations is merely the result of more assiduous cleaning of membership rolls, not the result of fewer actual committed members in the churches. Because of different roll-cleaning practices in different denominations, and yet the similar long-term declines, this theory can be only a partial explanation. Second is the theory that social involvement by mainline denominations caused the membership loss due to conflict and alienation of members. This theory was explicitly tested in several research studies but found no support. In addition, the membership downturns started before many Protestant churches became heavily committed to social action, and it continued after that social action abated. The only element of this theory supported by the research was that conflict within congregations, for whatever reason, is strongly associated with membership decline in those congregations. Third is the theory that we are in a new historical era, either due to “secularization,” or the rise of modern science, or increased affluence. But a theory of this sort is relevant for centuries or at least a half-century, and it is not helpful for explaining church membership trends which vary from decade to decade. (Also no one has proven that the rise of science or economic affluence would, even over a century, weaken the Christian church.) Whatever is causing present-day membership loss in mainline Protestantism is something new, and it was not present in American society in the 1940s and 1950s. II In search for the factors most important in explaining the trends, we distinguished factors internal to the church (leadership, theology, evangelism, and so on) from factors external to the church—which we called “contextual” (social change, migration, and so on). Our conclusion, based on available data, is that the contextual factors are relatively more important in explaining recent membership declines. The recent downturns are largely the product of changes in the social context, not of changes within the church. This conclusion was accepted by most of the working group but not all. For example, Dean Kelley (author of Why Conservative Churches Are Growing), who has made all his analyses of trends based on factors internal to the churches, doubted if contextual factors were very important. Yet the group agreed fairly well on most issues. From church data and nationwide survey data, it became clear that the decline in membership is due more to a decreasing number of new members than to any increase in “drop-outs.” The decline is also disproportionately a phenomenon of youth and young adults. In short, young adults are not coming into the churches in as fast a rate as in the 1950s or in as fast a rate as is needed to keep membership constant. Why not? The reason is not clear, but whatever it is, it disproportionately affects educated, affluent, and cosmopolitan young people. We scrutinized all attitude and value changes in the past two decades and found that, among young adults, attitudes toward churches are a part of a cluster of interrelated values, all of which have changed. These include ideas about marriage, sex, family, and freedom of individual behavior. The changes have been substantial since about 1960, and they are all directed at greater individualism, more personal freedom, and more tolerance of diversity. The young adults have become much more liberal than the churches, and the new attitudes seem to be in some conflict with church participation. In the latter 1970s, a gap exists between young adults and older adults on these issues, a gap which did not exist prior to 1960. A major conclusion of our work is that important social changes have hit the churches during 1960s and 1970s, and they have dramatically affected the denominations that are highest in social class and educational level. Futhermore, those denominations which are most sympathetic to the culture have been hit relatively harder. Pervasive cultural shifts are behind the membership decline in the churches, and this conclusion unfortunately carries few clear implications for church action to stem the losses. The problem is a deep one, and it will continue. The church is finding itself in a changed culture, and theological issues of Christ and culture are becoming urgent. Ill Meanwhile another line of research has produced new findings. In 1977 George Gallup, Jr. approached church researchers and offered his services. A committee was formed to sponsor a survey of "unchurched Americans.” The survey’s purpose was to find out who the unchurched people are and what might encourage them to church participation. A coalition of thirty-two religious groups contributed to the costs, and the survey was carried out in May 1978.4 In the Gallup study, an “unchurched" person is defined as one who is not a member of a church or synagogue or one who may nominally be a member but has not attended in the last six months, except for weddings, funerals, or special religious holidays. By this definition 41 percent of adult Americans are unchurched. Most of them have had religious training sometime in their lives; 77 percent have had some Sunday school education. Most were reared in homes having some religious identification. They do not comprise a separate anti-church subculture. Few are philosophically or ideologically opposed to Christianity or the church. Most of the unchurched believe in Christian doctrines. For example, 57 percent of the unchurched believe in life after death, compared with 83 percent of the churched. More than three-fourths of the unchurched say they pray, and 68 percent say that religion is “important” in their lives. Their uninvolvement is understandable mostly in terms of individualism, differences in life style, and value tensions. Eighty-six percent of the unchurched (compared with 76 percent of the churched) agreed that “an individual should arrive at his or her own religious beliefs independent of any churches or synagogues.” Eighty-eight percent agreed that “a person can be a good Christian if he or she doesn’t attend church among the churched, 70 percent agreed. Most of the unchurched had dropped out during adolescence or after a change in residence. The unchurched are younger than church members, and they are more liberal on such questions as abortion, sex norms, and civil liberties. These new sociological studies will be helpful to pastors and church leaders in sorting out current debates about church declines and evangelism. The problems facing the churches will not be solved soon. They are deeply embedded in the fabric of American society, the product of massive social forces not easily changed. They will occupy church people’s best efforts for years to come.
