Nagy-L István szerk.: Pápai Múzeumi Értesítő 11. (Pápa, 2006)
Haderő és hadviselés 1809-ben - DAVID HOLLINS: Ausztria vezérleti rendszere - a modern szervezet eredete
The main abilities for junior officer selection were technical knowledge, to be able to write clearly, ride, conduct cartography and explain the overall plan to column commanders. Increasingly, it became a training ground for future senior commanders, as staff majors were required to lead small formations and special missions - Staff Majors Mesko and Neipperg led the capture of Mt. Cenis in April 1800. If we consider the future chiefs of staff, it becomes quite clear where these men were drawn from: Although nearly all had joined as Kadett officers, they come from two main sources - the technicians from the artillery and engineers, who were often employed in directing siege warfare in the late 18 th century - men such as Johann Prochaska (artillery), Anton Zach and Johann Chasteler (engineers); the men who rose from the infantry including Peter Duka, Anton Mayer, Franz Weyrother and Heinrich Schmitt. A third group drawn from the infantry and cavalry initially served as Adjutants before being appointed to chief of staff with little or no time on the General staff - notably Karl Mack, Johann Radetzky and Max Wimpffen. While it is not an absolute rule, there is also a tendency for those, who came from the technical branches or were trained at the Engineer Officer School in Vienna, to take a more complex and scientific approach to planning than their infantry counterparts. There are clearly two lines of thought - the famously complex battle plans of Mack at Tourcoing and Weyrother at Austerlitz stand in contrast to the simplicity of Schmitt and Mayer's campaign plan of 1796. The Chief of Staff was responsible for the operations of the army and its internal administration, so he could allocate the jobs among the available staff officers and was consequently the most powerful man in the command structure. He would direct all the operational planning, which is why the armies could often be nominally commanded by Imperial princes. The only other specified positions on the staff for senior officers were the technical commanders, the Director of the Artillery (who controlled the reserve guns) and the Director of technical Troops (pioneers, engineers, miners etc.). The basis of all operational planning was and is intelligence gathering - so, the only other designated position was for a junior officer, who was known as the Capitaine des Guides. A Hauptmann, (captain), his job was the collation of intelligence information to provide an intelligence assessment for the planners formed from the reconnaissance units, reports from the frontline and long-range penetration of enemy forces. This junior officer thus had to be fully aware of army operations. However, the importance of spies meant that the Austrian 1767 Regulations expressly include two pages setting out the specific duties of a Chief of Staff in this part of his job: He would deal with the most important himself and would responsible for paying them enough to keep working. This assessment would then form the basis of the next planning phase and would also form the basis of the (often written) advice to the Commander-in-chief (often also in writing) and reports back to Vienna. The Austrian system also required that on campaign and in battle, multiple copies of the plans were issued. They would be drawn up by the Chief of Staff and the details filled in after the last discussion with the General. At Wagram - wounded in the first French attack on 5 Ih July 1809, Charles and h is senior staff agreed that only a counterattack based on a surprise assault by the left wing of the army offered any chance of success - Wimpffen drew up the plan, while Charles was being attended, and the Archduke merely signed the document after adding in the important times. The orders
