Nagy-L István szerk.: Pápai Múzeumi Értesítő 11. (Pápa, 2006)

Haderő és hadviselés 1809-ben - DAVID HOLLINS: Ausztria vezérleti rendszere - a modern szervezet eredete

were then issued as complete copies. In a battle or when the army had detached corps, a small number of staff would be allocated to the column commander as a smaller version of headquarters. The senior man, usually a Major, would be the chief of the column staff and his principal task would be to help the commander to understand what was intended. There are many references in army records to these columns as Korps, simply meaning a force larger than a division or a separate column operating away from the main army. This system gave the Austrians an important advantage over the French: the commanders of flank formations and corps could understand what was going on across the operational concepts behind the campaign or battle planning and act to help as required without further instructions. At Marengo, Ott soon realised that the main part of the army was having difficulty crossing the Bormida and without seeking further instructions, sent his advance-guard under GM Gottesheim to attack the French right and reduce their ability to oppose the frontal attack. However, the disadvantage was that a copy of the plan could go missing and one is known to have fallen into Napoleon's hands just prior to Rivoli in 1797. In addition to their staff, Austrian commanders had their own Adjutant staff, Colonels and Majors who would handle internal administration, ensure collection of unit and undertake other tasks as their chief required. The Flügel Adjutants were the junior officers, who also were used as messengers. Although the peacetime staff had considerable planning responsibilities, they were not involved in army administration or policy-making. The administration was conducted by the Hofkriegsrat, (Imperial War Council), which was usually under the influence of the Foreign Ministry, which enjoyed most influence over the Emperor. The Hofkriegsrat would appoint the army Commanders-in-Chief in the name of the Emperor, but this was in reality more of political role - the commander would be responsible to Vienna for fulfilling those overall objectives and leading and inspiring his men in battle. As today, but of course, not for Napoleon, the overall campaign objectives for the Austrian army were set by the politicians in Vienna, who often also established their own planning staff just to confuse the situation. As the preparations for war began, plans would be devised by this mix of the General Staff, the politicians' advisers and some of the senior field commanders. However, once in the field, within that remit, the Commander-in-chief and his Chief of Staff would devise the operational plans. It is widely believed that the Vienna Hofkriegsrat tried to direct campaigns at a great distance, but in fact, they realised the importance of the Chief of Staff to ensure overall control of operations. Thugut., who was Foreign Minister for much of the 1790s gathered willing senior staff officers, notably Weyrother, Zach and Chasteler, and arranged for them to be appointed as Chiefs of Staff to ensure control of both Austrian and in 1799, Russian forces. This potential conflict between military and political priorities caused considerable problems within the field armies - the other officers resented their power and could not understand why some decisions were being taken, which seemed to be contrary to military requirements. This failure in the system was most obvious in the Marengo campaign. The sickly General Melas, with the politicians pressurising him from Vienna, had Zach as his Chief of Staff, who was acting as Vienna wished. However, Adjutant General, Radetzky, who was a trusted aide to Melas and popular across the army,