Levéltári Közlemények, 38. (1967)

Levéltári Közlemények, 38. (1967) 2. - FORRÁSKÖZLÉS - Karsai Elek: Iratok a Smuts-misszió történetéhez / 237–249. o.

Iratok a Smuts-misszió történetéhez 243 Pesth and those members who had remained behind were quite safe and still in communication with the new Government. A memorandum on the treatment of the Allied Missions prepared by the members of my staff from information collected at Buda-Pesth, as also a memorandum regarding the political conditions in Hungary is annexed hereto. (See Enclosures V and VI).

2 The Government considered itself as still at peace with the Allies and professed to adhere to the two Armistices, but was in considerable doubt and fear as to the future attitude of the Allies towards the Sovyet Government and whether war sould not be declared against them. They were, therefore, very much elated and even amazed that an emissary of the Great Powers had come to speak to them, and as the fact was obviously of great significance to the new Government they have in their numerous prose communiques exploited it to the full. This risk was, however, well worth running, as it is certain that an important change has been brought about in the attitude of the new Government. Before my arrival they were seriously apprehensive ot the attitude of the Great Powers towards them, and although they had concluded no alliance with the Moscow Government, they were leaning heavily towards Russia for support against a possible hostile movement by the Great Powers. Now that this fear has been removed from their minds they are obviously more inclined to stand well with the Great Powers, and the danger of their joining with the Russians in, an attack upon Roumania has not only been minimised but probably definitely removed. The Hungarian Government are anxious to attend conferences with us, and to work out their future relations under our aegis, and have probably by our wise and conciliatory attitude been definitely deflected from any pro-Russian course. It is also certain that we could by wise counsel considerably modify the excesses of their communist policy, and thus prevent them from doing too much harm during the more or less short period of their power in Hungary. For there is no doubt that they will have to go. As a Government they are very weak. They consist intirely of Jews and do not represent more than the large Jewish proletariat of BudaPesth. Outside the capital their authority is very small, if not practically non-existent, and in Buda-Pesth itself they represent only a minority. Hungary is not a Bolshevist country, and with wise handling on the part of the Great Powers will not long persist in a Bolshevist policy. The Government is sharply divided into a moderate socialist element and an agressive Communist section, of which Béla Kun, at present Chief Commissary both for War and Foreign Affairs, and a personal friend of Lenin, appears to be the leader. The Communists are in the ascendant for the moment, but the excesses of their confiscatory policy in Buda-Pesth are already leading to a change of feeling, and a reaction is certain to follow, although perhaps not before the Communist have tried their hands at some more disastrous social experiments. In spite of these temporary aberrations and excesses, however, it seems to mo clear that the wise course for the Great Powers to pursue is to keep Hungary in hand and away from Russia, and this can best be done by the steady following of the policy initiated by my Mission. The bourgeoisie and moderate elements are cowed today, but they are sure to revive; and if we remain on the spot this revival will come all the sooner and be all the healthier. After those general remarks I proceed to deal with the Armistice negotiations. As I have said, the Hungarian Government appear to adhere to the two Armistices, and more particularly to that of the 13th November which especially concerns them. Indeed they assumed throughout the discussion that they were bound by the Armistices, and the only difficulty with them was as to the extent of our constantly growing demands for further withdrawals of the Hungarian forces, culminating in the final request of Colonel Vix which precipitated the fall of Count 2 Az V. sz. melléklet, melynek címe „Memorandum regarding treatment of Allied Missions and Subjects by Hungarian Authorities" hat oldal terjedelmű és a következő részekre oszlik: 1. Bizonyos francia egységek elfogatása és internálása; 2. Bánásmód a brit motorcsónakokkal a Dunán; 3. A Szövetséges Katonai Missziók távozása; 4. A Duna elaknásítása; 5. Külföldi javak és állampolgárok helyzete Budapesten. — A melléklet végül közli Kun Béla 1919. április 4-í rendeletét az idegen alattvalók védelméről. A VI. sz. melléklet, melynek címe „Observation on general situation in Hungary" hét oldal terjedelmű és részletesen foglalkozik a Károlyi-rezsim bukásának okaival, elemzi a „Commune" célkitűzéseit és ideológiáját, az orosz helyzettel való egyezését és különbségét, a súlyos belső gazdasági helyzetet, végül a jövő kilátásaival foglalkozik. E melléklethez csatolta Smuts tábornok Károlyi proklamációját a kormány lemondásáról.