Hungarian Heritage Review, 1987 (16. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1987-07-01 / 7. szám
—iffeature of (Ebe JtWtb PART II: HUNGARIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING THE RÁKÓCZI WAR OF INDEPENDENCE — by — PETER PASTOR The only visible expression of Peter’s goodwill was the arrival of his envoy to Hungary. The old diplomat, Emelian I. Ukraintsev, however, was not sent as a permanent resident, but as a special ambassador. On June 12, 1708, Peter I instructed him to inform Rákóczi of the tsar’s efforts to mediate. Peter’s friendship was to be demonstrated by the envoy’s claim that the tsar had refused to accept an Austrian request for military aid. As mediator, Ukraintsev was to present the Austrians and the Hungarians with terms that had previously been proposed by the Anglo-Dutch mediators and deemed unacceptable to both parties. These terms were to grant amnesty to the insurgents, and to reestablish traditional constitutional liberties in Hungary and Transylvania. The proposal would have Rákóczi remain the prince of Transylvania, but only as a vassal of the Emperor. The discussions at Eger, following Ukraintsev’s arrival on August 19, were conducted in a dejected atmosphere. On August 3, the insurrectionary forces were decisively beaten at Trencsen, a battle that marked the beginning of the insurgents’ decline. Nevertheless, the Hungarians insisted that the Russian resident in Vienna should propose the recognition of a sovereign Transylvania and call for international guarantees of the settlement. While in Eger, Ukraintsev also met with des Alleurs, who characteristically dismissed the chances for French mediation to end the Great Northern War. He told Ukraintsev, “Charles still has an account to settle with Peter.” Ukraintsev thus learned that part of Peter’s goal (and the reason behind Russo-Hungarian rapprochement) had no chance of succeeding. The mission was cut short by Ukraintsev’s death on September 11. Recent Hungarian and Soviet sources attribute his death to fever, but Rákóczi in his memoirs claimed that Ukraintsev drank himself to death. His mission was not followed up, although Rákóczi often requested Peter to send an envoy to Hungary. This indicates that Ukraintsev’s reports about the Hungarians’ military and diplomatic position persuaded Peter to ignore the plight of Hungary. In contrast to the Russian’s lack of enthusiasm, the Hungarians did their best to maintain friendly contacts with the tsar and to gain his effective support. Sándor Nedeczky became a roving ambassador, constantly moving in order to keep up with Peter and his ministers. The sincerity of Rakoczi’s friendship was demonstrated by the transmission of Hungarian intelligence information. This included reports of Swedish moves in Poland and of anti-Russian activities by the envoys of Charles XII and Stanislaw in Constantinople. In January 1708 a message to Nedeczky included the Hungarian appraisal of the situation in Constantinople. Nedeczky was instructed to inform the tsar that, if the sultan decided on war, it would be only against Russia as he was afraid of involving the Emperor in a conflict. In March 1708, Rákóczi named a permanent envoy to Peter’s court. Mate Thalaba’s first duty was to apprise Peter of the Hungarian efforts at Versailles on Russia’s behalf. Thalaba arrived in Smolensk in July and remained there until December. The Hungarian ambassador, however, was not allowed to take up residence in Peter’s camp, and was forced to live in Moscow, which Peter rarely visited. Considering that a formal alliance existed between Peter and Rákóczi, Thalaba’s cool welcome was a further indication of the tsar’s lack of enthusiasm for the alliance, and was all the more significant because he carried a letter of introduction from the Marquis des Alleurs. This made him not only an agent of Rákóczi but also of the French. Thalaba’s exclusion from Peter’s camp indicated that the tsar took Ukraintsev’s reports seriously, and had abandoned his hopes for French mediation. The two Hungarian envoys approached their responsibilities enthusiastically, although Nedeczky developed a strong dislike toward Thalaba. When Nedeczky complained to Rákóczi about Thalaba’s capabilities, he was reprimanded for creating dissension and thus reflecting badly on Hungary. Nedeczky’s doubts have since been reinforced by the judgment of historians. In October 1707 Rákóczi sent László Kokenyesdi to Versailles to win Louis XIV’s support for mediation. The Hungarian found little interest in France in the project. Kokenyesdi tried to sway the secretary of foreign affairs, Marquis de Torcy, by dangling the potential support of 80,000 Russian troops before him. Torcy dismissed Kokenyesdi’s claim that a Russian alliance was in France’s interest, identifying the putative Russian reinforcements as 80,000 cowards who could be beaten by 8,000 Swedes. Further disquieting news for Hungary was Versailles’s intention to replace de Ferriol at the Sublime Porte with des Alleurs. Kokenyesdi tried his best to dissuade the court from its decision, as he was aware of des Alleurs’s anti-Russian sentiments. His efforts were not successful: at the end of 1709 des Alleurs was appointed ambassador to Constantinople. If Hungarian efforts on Russia’s behalf failed to succeed, Russia’s halfhearted moves on behalf of Hungary fared no better. The Russian envoy in Vienna was Baron Johann Urbich. Soviet historiography claims that, unlike the English and Dutch mediation effort, the Russian was sincere, and that, in contrast to the English and Dutch ambassadors, Urbich was full of goodwill toward the Hungarians. This claim is unfounded, not only because overwhelming evidence indicates pro-Hungarian sentiments among the Maritime Powers, but also because the Hungarians attempted to have Urbich replaced for being pro-Austrian. For this reason in the fall of 1708 Rákóczi requested through Thalaba that Peter take a —continued next page 16 HUNGARIAN HERITAGE REVIEW JULY 1987
