Hungarian Heritage Review, 1987 (16. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1987-07-01 / 7. szám
feature of ®lje 3Rontl| cue from the Maritime Powers and send a special envoy to Vienna whose responsibility would be limited to mediation. This request went unheeded, a further indication that Peter was not doing his best for the Hungarians. Even had they been more wholehearted, it is unlikely that Russian mediative efforts could have succeeded where the Maritime Powers had failed; pre-Poltava Russia did not carry enough diplomatic weight to bring Vienna to a compromise. Peter’s procrastination shows that by the end of 1708 he had given up his illconceived idea of having the Hungarians as intermediaries, and lost his interest in Hungarian affairs. The Hungarian insurgents ceased to be considered as allies and became suppliants to Russia. Russia’s victory at Poltava on June 27, 1709, has been seen by historians as a turning point in its international position. Yet victory was not translated into active help for the Hungarians. The hapless Rákóczi, who could not fathom Peter’s change of mind, saw in Poltava his deliverance. He learned about the Swedes’ defeat at the end of July. His reaction was of triumphant optimism, as he wrote to Count Bercsényi: “If God is willing, our fate will be a crowning success. ” This belief led him to draw even closer to Russia. Nedeczky in Russia was less optimistic. In his reports to Rákóczi he appraised the chances for Russian help more realistically. He asserted that Hungarian defeat at Trencsen and Russian victory at Poltava weakened Rakoczi’s case at the tsar’s court. Nevertheless, he advised Rákóczi to continue his friendly policy and to renew the effort to bring about a Russo- French alliance. These steps were seen as preventing Russia from an alliance with Vienna. Charles XII’s retreat to Moldavia created immediate problems for Rákóczi. He feared that his troops were in no position to stop Charles’s march across insurgent territory if the Swede so decided. This had the potential of angering Peter. These fears became even more real in the middle of August when in a letter Peter officially informed him of victory. The tsar called on him to stop Charles XII from crossing Hungary in accordance with their Warsaw alliance. Hungarian apprehensions were allayed only when it became evident that the Swedish monarch had set up headquarters in Bender on Ottoman territory in order to work for a Swedish- Ottoman rematch against the Russians. Charles XII’s continued belligerence against Peter the Great rekindled Rakoczi’s hope that he could still be useful to Russia by mediating peace. For this reason, he sent Pal Raday, the head of his chancellery, to Bender. His mission was to press Charles XII for peace and to talk him out of an anti-Russian alliance with the Turks. His assignment was a fiasco as Charles, much annoyed with the Hungarians, refused to give him audience. In spite of his best efforts, Rákóczi unwittingly managed to anger Peter the Great. In October 1709 the Kievan voivode Jozef Potocki, a supporter of Charles XII, sought refuge in Hungary. In return he offered his four thousand troops to Rákóczi. Rákóczi, who was in great need of fresh troops, welcomed the opportunity. This greatly annoyed Peter, who had hoped that a repentent Potocki would enter into the service of Augustus, who had become a claimant to the Polish throne once again. The subsequent departure of Potocki and his troops in April 1710 to Bender was further embarrassment for Rákóczi, whom the tsar described as not a man of his word. To allay the tsar’s ire, Rákóczi decided to send his French secretary, Herbaix, on a diplomatic mission to Russia. Rakoczi’s jubilation over Poltava was not shared by the powers in Europe. France was disappointed over this extension of the Great Northern War. Although Queen Anne saluted the tsar as emperor, the English considered Russia’s new power along the Baltic a threat. The reaction in Vienna was equally unenthusiastic. In August Baron Urbich even complained to Leibniz that “the people begin to fear the tsar as they feared Sweden.’’ The famous thinker agreed that in public opinion the tsar was “a kind of northern Turk.” Significantly, Rákóczi also saw in Poltava a new opportunity for Russia to replace Turkey as a great east European power. Thus he revived the proposal he made to Peter in 1707, believing it to be even more appropriate in 1709. His project was written in a form of dialogue, which was a popular stylistic device for political tracts. The dialogue, “Conversations between Two Ministers of the Tsar,” included Rakoczi’s position, Peter’s possible objections, and rebuttals of them. The proposal suggested the establishment of a Russian Imperium Orientale Graecum. An independent Hungary, Transylvania and Poland were to provide aid for Peter’s liberation of the Balkan peoples. They were also to form a barrier against Austrian interference in the rearrangement of southeastern Europe. The text of this dialogue was sent in September 1709 to Nedeczky, who was already en route on another diplomatic mission in Russia. He was ordered to translate the Latin version into Russian and to transmit it to Peter I. The tsar, however, was now interested in peace with the Ottomans rather than in challenging them to war. To keep the peace, he was even willing to come to an understanding with Charles XII, who was still in Bender agitating for war. Early in 1710 peace negotiations resumed between the French and the Grand Alliance. The talks broke down, however, and finally led France to reconsider Russia’s overtures. It was now accepted that, in return for French mediation between Russia and Sweden, Peter the Great would mediate between France and the Grand Alliance. France’s revived interest in Russia made it possible for Kokenyesdi to present Rakoczi’s proposals to Louis XIV. These stated that, following peace between Sweden and Russia, in accordance with the Warsaw treaty Russia was to come to the aid of Hungary against Austria. The Hungarian note also stressed that Russia would be even more agreeable to such a policy if France would offer it an alliance. Kokenyesdi was soon informed by Torcy that France supported the Hungarian scheme, and Baluze was again sent to Moscow. The Hungarian envoy left Paris triumphantly to report the good news to Rákóczi. While the Hungarians were making their diplomatic efforts on behalf of Peter, Urbich was trying to work for Rákóczi in Vienna. Urbich returned from consultations in Russia, saw Rákóczi in May 1710, and took a Hungarian representative with him to present Rakoczi’s offer to the Habsburg court. Rakoczi’s envoy, however, was arrested and imprisoned in Pozsony much to Urbich’s embarrassment. This was seen as a rebuff to Russian in tentions to intervene in what Vienna considered Habsburg internal affairs. A further blow to Russia’s prestige was the Habsburg chancellery’s rejection of Peter’s —continued next page JULY 1987 HUNGARIAN HERITAGE REVIEW 17
