Hungarian Heritage Review, 1987 (16. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1987-07-01 / 7. szám
feature of '(Ülje 3MtmtI| request to be called by the title “Imperatore Magnae-Russiae cum titolo ‘Augustissimi, ’ et ‘Excellentiae’. ” Rákóczi was informed about Russia’s diplomatic failure in Vienna, and hoped this would lead to its fulfillment of the military terms of their alliance. In June 1710, when Rákóczi sent his French secretary Herbaix to Peter I, he was charged not only to explain away the embarrassing Potocki affair but also to remind the tsar that Austria’s actions indicated that the Habsburgs were Russia’s natural enemies. In the note Herbaix carried, Rákóczi claimed that Vienna would make an alliance with the Sublime Porte. The prince reminded the tsar that for this reason the survival of independent Hungary was essential to Russia’s interest. Peter was warned that Austria would not allow him to “reestablish” his throne in Constantinople. Given this line of reasoning, Rákóczi requested Peter to reread the dialogue sent to him the year before. Rakoczi’s communication to Peter reflected a sense of resignation to Russia’s nonintervention. While it asked for support for Rakoczi’s continued resistance, it also requested the tsar for asylum in the Ukraine in case of defeat. Rákóczi was requesting a solution similar to the one Peter had offered him in the Warsaw treaty if the Polish projects failed. While willing to accept Peter’s sovereignty over him, he proposed that his retinue should continue to be his subjects. He also offered to exchange his lands in Hungary, including his famous vineyards in Tokaj, with Aleksandr Menshikov’s in Russia. He asked Peter to occupy Munkács with 3,000 to 4,000 troops on the pretext of forming a barrier to Swedish retreat, and called on the tsar to protect his personal property in Transylvania. In appeal to Peter’s vanity, Rakoczi’s note addressed the tsar as Augustissime Magnae-Russiae Imperatore. Herbaix, whose voyage to St. Petersburg took almost half a year, transmitted Rakoczi’s note at the end of November. Peter’s response of December 9 (November 29) was not very promising, although the friendly tone of the letter indicated that he had forgiven Rákóczi for his handling of Potocki. He avoided, however, giving a clear reply to any of the prince’s proposals. In 1710, while a number of special envoys were sent to Russia, the two regular ones were ready to return home. Unable to press Peter to translate his commitments into action, they requested their own recall. Thalaba left Moscow in April amidst a flurry of charges. Before his departure, Nedeczky informed him that he had incurred Rakoczi’s wrath for behavior unbecoming a resident and for working for two masters — des Alleurs and Rákóczi. As an agent of des Alleurs Thalaba kept contact with some Swedish prisoners of war, including Charles XII’s prime minister, Count Karl Piper, and General Gustav Rehnschiold. Since des Alleurs opposed Rakoczi’s pro-Russian policy, Thalaba came to represent two divergent policies in Moscow, and for this reason Nedeczky accused him of disloyalty to Rákóczi. To emphasize Thalaba’s error in representing des Alleurs, Nedeczky also informed his colleague that des Alleurs had been expelled from Hungary. Charged with ineptitude and treasonous behavior, Thalaba embarked on his return trip with great misgivings. Des Alleurs’s departure from Hungary, however, was due to a new appointment rather than his expulsion. In December 1709 he learned that he had been selected as the new ambassador to Constantinople. He left Hungary on February 24, but instead of traveling straight to the Ottoman capital, he made a detour to Bender, where he arrived on March 17. Charles XII and des Alleurs used this opportunity to scheme together to incite the Turks to attack Russia with the support of the Swedes. Des Alleurs arrived on April 24 in Constantinople, where he proceeded to support Swedish goals in official circles. Since news of des Alleurs’s itinerary reached Rákóczi almost immediately, he could easily imagine what had transpired between des Alleurs and Charles XII. Reports of their anti-Russian activities soon confirmed Hungarian fears. Des Alleurs’s doings were also reported to the tsar by Piotr Tolstoy. In light of des Alleurs’s actions, Thalaba’s services to Rákóczi appeared even more treasonous. Fearing punishment, Thalaba decided not to return to Hungary. Instead, he embarked on a journey to Bender to present Charles XII with some secret documents entrusted to him by the Swedes in Moscow. Writing to Rákóczi about his decision, Thalaba claimed that he wanted to show these invaluable papers to Rákóczi first, as they could be used to further Hungary’s cause. In an effort to prove his patriotism, however, he decided instead to deliver them at once to Charles XII in the hope that both the Swedes and the Turks would embark on a policy favorable to Hungary. The documents were forwarded to Charles XII by Piper, Rehnschiold, and the Swedish kings’ secretary Cederhjelm. These men seem to have had considerable liberty in Moscow, as they were empowered to negotiate an exchange of prisoners of war. Among the documents was an alleged plan for a Russian attack first on the Crimea and then on Constantinople. These plans had been acquired by Cederhjelm, and Thalaba claimed that the accompanying maps had been transmitted to the Swedes by Peter’s vice-admiral, Korneliy Kruys. Charles XII was delighted to receive the packet, and he regretted only that Thalaba could not have arrived earlier with the maps, the existence of which had been reported earlier to Charles by des Alleurs. The Swedish king believed that with these maps he could have persuaded the Sublime Porte to initiate war against Russia earlier. These documents may have strengthened the resolve of the Ottomans who declared war on November 20, 1710. Thalaba’s “patriotic” service, however, was not recompensed by Swedish or Ottoman military help for Hungary. The outbreak of the war made Kokenyesdi’s mission to Peter superfluous. Kokenyesdi, who had returned from Versailles with the news of Baluze’s mission, was ordered back to France. Rákóczi, who saw in Kokenyesdi’s report success for Hungarian efforts to bring about peace, also instructed his envoy on his way back to France to make a detour to Russia. In Russia he was to emphasize that Baluze’s mission was a result of Hungarian diplomatic efforts. The long journey which started on October 1 took Kokenyesdi to Riga by early January. It was there that he learned about the new war with the Ottomans from the tsar’s minister, Baron von Lowenwold. The Russian official blamed des Alleurs for the conflict. The French role in the war made Kokenyesdi fear that he and Baluze would be sent by the tsar “to see Siberia.” Peter the Great, who at first believed —continued next page 18 HUNGARIAN HERITAGE REVIEW JULY 1987
