Hungarian Heritage Review, 1987 (16. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1987-07-01 / 7. szám
:,3Fcaturf of (D}c 3Htmth that Kokenyesdi was Louis XIV’s envoy, accused the French king of having evil intentions and refused to give audience to the Hungarian when he arrived in Moscow in February. In deference to Rákóczi, however, Kokenyesdi was allowed to discuss matters with Golovkin and Shafirov, two of the tsar’s aides. Peter’s suspicions about the French were justifiable. Rakoczi’s alliance with Peter I did not stop de Ferriol from pressing for a Swedish-Ottoman-Tatar war against Russia. Des Alleurs followed this policy with royal approval. Yet to find French diplomacy the chief culprit for war is incorrect. French diplomats had been working toward war since 1706. The fact that peace prevailed until November 1710 indicates that their efforts, as Louis XIV admitted early the same year, were not successful. It is more convincing to consider the Turkish-Russian war as a consequence of internal political needs and a power struggle among Ottoman officials. The Soviet historian S. F. Oreshkova recently attempted to bring consistency to the seemingly conflicting activities of Baluze and des Alleurs. She proposed that the French sought war in Constantinople in order subsequently to act as mediators for the price of a Franco-Russian alliance against Austria. She claimed that such an alliance was also the purpose of Baluze’s mission. Her thesis is unconvincing. The evidence is that France wanted Sweden and not Russia for an ally. Moreover, instructions to Baluze indicate that he was sent to Russia to mediate, not to offer an alliance. Russia was expected to do the same for Louis XIV and for Rákóczi in Vienna. Only Kokenyesdi and Rákóczi believed and reported that the French aimed to establish an alliance. For the French policymakers, Baluze’s mission was an option. French goals seemed to have failed in Constantinople. A victorious end to the War of the Spanish Succession with Swedish help seemed unlikely. An alternative, a mediated end to the war, was preferable to its continuation. In July 1710, when Baluze was sent north with this aim in mind, Louis XIV could not have foreseen that the hitherto unsuccessfully sought war between Russia and Turkey would be declared while the French envoy was en route to Moscow. By the time Kokenyesdi learned that his mission in Russia had no purpose, the fortunes of the insurgents in Hungary had taken a turn for the worse. Insurrectionary territory had been reduced to northern Hungary, the epicenter of the uprising. In desperation, Bercsényi was sent to Poland on November 26 to seek contact with Prince Yakov Dolgorukiy and Augustus II. With the Ottoman-Russian war on the horizon, he was unable to achieve anything positive. For these reasons, while armistice negotiations were being conducted between the Austrian commander, Janos Pallfy, and the insurgent commander, Sándor Karolyi, Rákóczi decided to meet with Peter I. He hoped that a personal encounter would finally induce the tsar to rescue the floundering uprising. On February 21, 1711, Rákóczi left for Poland. In his absence, Karolyi reached accommodation with the Austrians. The ensuing Peace of Szatmar (Satu Mare) of April 30 ended eight years of conflict with a compromise. Although it provided amnesty for the insurrectionaries, Rákóczi became an exile. The meeting between Rákóczi and Peter the Great took place on May 12 in Yavorov, near Lvov. Peter assured Rákóczi that, despite Szatmar, he would come to his military aid following his expected victory over Turkey. Since Peter did little to help Rákóczi while the kuruc forces were on the battlefield, it is unlikely that these promises were more than perfunctory. The defeat of the tsar's forces on the River Prut on July 12 crushed all hopes, if there were any, for Russian aid to Rákóczi. When the prince again met the tsar in Dzidzilow on August 21, Peter could only offer him asylum in the form of land in the Ukraine. The insurgent soldiers were invited to join Peter’s army. Rákóczi turned down Peter’s offer of land, hoping that France was still interested in rekindling resistance in Hungary. The Peace of Utrecht of 1713 ended the War of the Spanish Succession and France lost any final interest in supporting Rakoczi’s “diversion.” ***** The balance sheet of Hungarian- Russian relations during the war of independence indicates that neither mutual hostility nor subsequent friendship brought either harm or profit to either side. At the beginning of the conflict neither the Hungarians nor the Russians showed much interest in each other’s affairs. This phase was followed by Russian offers to the Emperor to crush the rebellion in return for Russia’s admission into the Grand Alliance. At the same time the Hungarians saw advantage in inciting the Sublime Porte to declare war on Russia. They, like the French, hoped that this war would end the Russo-Swedish conflict and would bring Swedish help against the Habsburgs. Neither Russian nor Hungarian overtures brought the expected response. The new phase of friendship was initiated by Peter the Great. It was done in a moment of desperation when the tsar believed that Rákóczi could prevail on France to stop agitating against Russia in Constantinople and mediate peace with the Swedes. In the absence of such results, and in consequence of Russia’s increased sense of security after Poltava, the tsar neglected the commitments he had made to the Hungarians. The half-hearted attempts at Russian mediation in the Austro- Hungarian conflict were rejected by Vienna. Sorely needed military aid, which should have been provided by Rákóczi, was never contemplated. Rákóczi saw that the national liberation movement could survive only with foreign help. He hoped that Russia, unlike the other powers, would be willing and able to provide the insurgents with decisive aid. With this in mind, the Hungarians tried their best to ingratiate themselves with the Russians. They provided the Russian leaders with intelligence information and even supplied Peter and his courtiers with highly prized Tokaj wines. Their efforts to bring an end to the Great Northern War through French mediation, however, failed. Instead, the tsar became convinced that Louis XIV was culpable in instigating the Turks against Russia. Rákóczi attempted to impress on the tsar that an independent Hungary balancing Austria was in Russia’s best interest. The Hungarian prince was among the first who recognized that Russia had become a great power capable of controlling eastern Europe. Evidently Peter was not won over. His attention was still riveted on Russia’s northward and southward expansion and for this reason he saw no need for the restoration of Hungary as a power in the European constellation. The first episode of Hungarian-Russian relations had no lasting impact. It was just another example of an inconsequential combination of eighteenth-century diplomacy. JULY 1987 HUNGARIAN HERITAGE REVIEW 19
