1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2
■ PART I CFISIS REQUIRES ACTION At a Turning Point Consensus has come to an end. It has suddenly dawned on the country that the power structure is nőt going to fulfill its promises. The consequences of economic decline are already beginning to affect even the blue-collar elite and the middle stratum of intellectuals. The public no longer believes that there is any sense in making ever-newer sacrifices. The leadership is wavering. It does nőt understand why it is unable to turn the worsening trends around. It has nőt the fainest idea what to do about the sudden tide of dissatisfaction. It has less and less control of its own actions and is inereasingly unable to conceal its internál division. The apparatuses are uneasy. They sense the mounting anger and find that their customary techniques are nőt always sufficient to keep the people in line. And they are missing their proven agents: prominent personalities outside the party are withdrawing their support of official policy, and the party's ránk and fiié is becoming unmanagable. The generál dissatisfaction personifies its target. Just as earlier the country associated the successes of the consolidation period with János Kadar, now it is associating with him the failures at the end of that period. The generál secretary's popularity is declining even faster than the value of the forint. There is just one thing on which everyone, from blue-collar worker to party cadre, is in agreement: Kadar must go. New Faces or New Policy? János Kadar has been the symbol of the golden middle road in Hungary. He, in contrast with Rákosi, has nőt attempted to force on the people grandiose programs fór society's transformation. And unlike Imre Nagy, he has been unwilling to accept curbs on the Communist Party's ruie. Holding a monopoly of power, he has avoided encroachment of his interests by any group capable of voicing discontent. And he has allowed everyone to find compensation fór one's losses, wherever possible. The country—tortured by Stalinism, disappointed in the irresistible force of the 1956 uprising, exsanguinated and worn weary during the years of reprisal—approved of Kadar's policy of consolidation, longing fór a secure and peaceful life. In exchange, it accepted that the party rules in the name »* 4
