1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2
name of tbe people, and tbe apparátus rules in tbe name of tbe party's ránk and fiié. Tbie vas tbe so-called consensuB. Bút by nov nobody believes tbat aocial conflicts can be avoided by deferring drastic decisions. Caution is seen as inability to act. Secrecy, as tbe concealment of failures. Tbe monopoly of pover, as an obstacle to resolving tbe crisis. And all this is indeed true. Kadar bears personal responsibility fór tbe leadersbip's inertia. He vas tbe one vho announced in 1983 tbat tbere vould be no second reform. .In 1984, he vas the one vho insisted on tbe 7th Five-Year Plán'8 irresponsible program fór reviving tbe economy. In 1983, he orcbestrated tbe party congress that simultaneously promised more investment, more consumption, improvement of our balance of payments, and more moderate rates of inflation. He played a decisive role in that tbe magnitude of tbe probléma vas concealed from society, and the public vas barred from the debates on finding a vay to resolve tbem. Tbere vili be no meaningful cbange as long as the minister of fináncé and the chairman of the National Planning Office, ratber than Kadar, are retired. As long as "our policy” is 6ound, and tbere are mistakes only in its "implementet ion." Bút Kadar's departure in itself vould nőt solve anytbing. If his successors attempt to correct the "mistakes" of the pást fev years by revert ing to the party's policy "proven over 30 years," then the crisis vili run its course. We vili be left to vegetate amidet ever-vorse living conditions. And in the background tbere vili be the specter of catastropbe: the State could become insolvent vitbin a fev years, and there may come a period of pover cuts, endless queues and plunging reál incomes. An actual collapse does nőt even have to occur: the constant threat of collapse is in itself sufficient to make the situation untenable. Ve need a radical political cbange. From Consensus to a Social Contract There is no simple solution to tbe Hungárián economy's present problems. It is nőt enough to say, as it vaE said in 1953, sometbing to the effect that if tbe artifical forcing of investment in heavy industry vere stopped, there vould immediately be more fór the consumers. Abandonment of the spendtbrift industrial policy vould adversely affect alsó tbe population in tbe short term. Even the best program of consolidation and grovth vould produce temporary unemployment and a decline of tbe living standard, and vould create tensions betveen social strata, industries and districts. Vbat could the leadership do about tbese conflicts? One possible course of action vould be to attempt to compensate the masses vith social, national or racial demagoguery. By launcbing order-restoration, mobilization and centralization drives, in combination vith political hy6teria. A sort of northveBtera Románia. Bút ve see vbere that leads. Another course of action vould be to enforce the requirement6 of a markét economy and to suppres6 vith an iron bánd any manifestation of society's r íT ♦
