Habersack, Sabine - Puşcaş, Vasile - Ciubotă, Viorel (szerk.): Democraţia in Europa centrală şi de Sud-Est - Aspiraţie şi realitate (Secolele XIX-XX) (Satu Mare, 2001)
Stepan Vidnyansky: Central-Eastern Europe int he Period Between Two World Wars: Between Democracy and Dictatorship
imposed the so called penal sanctions on Hungarians and Austrians. But the power in these countries already was in hands of strong national leaders. Austria turned into little country with a population about of 6,5 million. According to the conditions of peace treaty, as it was mentioned, it was forbided to ally with Germany. With respect to the losed countries, the principle of national self-determination was broken all the time by the winners. In particular, the natural border was promised to Italians, which runed across the Brenner cross, though at that, almost a quarter of million of German-speaking Tyroleses happened in Italy. New Czechoslovakia obtained a «historical» border and, as a result, it received Bohemia and 3,5 million German-speaking Austrians. Beside this, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and also Romania divided between themself the Ukrainians who lived in Western Ukraine. Hungary was divided, and in its structure stayed just regions with Hungarian majority. It became a little country with 8 millions of citizens. And about 750 000 of Hungarians find themself in Czechoslovakia, a lot of them - in Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians and Romania. It is clear why Hungary violently protested against such conditions of peace treaty and demanded to reconsider it. But these quite natural demands gave rise to serious fear of its neighbours - Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, who created the so called Little Antanta to withstand to Hungarian revisionism in respect of unjust borders. So, according to the Versailles system of peace treaties was held such division of borders in Central-Eastern Europe owing to which in many countries sprang up regions with national minorities, which find themselves inthere not from their own free will (17 millions people find themselve on the territories of other countries). And they hardly could calculate on the support of the Versailles System. Because of this, the tide of shovinism and nationalism, excited by the First World War, didn’t stoped. Its strength was supported by the filling of the national humiliation, especially among Hungarians and Germans, who frankly dreamed of the revision of Peace Treaties. During the preparation of the treaties were made so much unsatisfactory compromices that not only losed countries, but also former allied countries were marginally unsatisfied by some conditions of the treaties. But for all that, Paris peacemakers, Wilson in particular, placed on the League of Nations (1919-1946) great hopes. Statute of it became the part of Versailles Peace Treaty (as Wilson persisted). But, as further historical events showed in international relations - League of Nations didn’t justified these hopes. It’s difficult to not agree with the conclusion of famous English historic Dg. Grenwill that “in 1919 in Paris didn’t layed a strong foundation of peace. It could be too unreal to wait for another Between democracy and dictatorship 143
