Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 1. szám)
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28 Marius Diaconescu suggest the constraint of those values. We can understand from the document that Vladislav accepted the relation of vassality with the Hungarian kings at the time. What some would call a compromise and a success of the voivode's political view, which was allowed to rule over a territory enclosing a commercial route143, appears, nevertheless, to be a document which the suzerain actually imposed. The confirmation coming from a vassal, who was the direct governor of the territory meant a guarantee for the merchants' privilege in the event of virtual impediments coming from the Wallachian officials. The Romanian voivode's attitude was not consistent. In the first part of the year 1368, he still appears as vassal of the Hungarian king, requested to collaborate with the Bulgarian banus, the Himffy brothers144. In July 1368, at the beginning of the Bulgarian uprising against the Hungarian domination, he even was asked to bring military support for the repression145. Vladislav's obligation to provide military help did not derive from his quality of banus of Severin146, but from that of vassal of the Hungarian king147. Although he initially promised to give the requested help148, some time towards August 1368 he decided to join the king's enemies. In September, the king ordered the gathering of the nobility army in order to proceed to a campaign against the Romanian voivode149. The development of the conflict between the Hungarian armies and the voivode's troops was studied from various angles. Documentary mentions as well as John of Târnave's chronicle have been used as information sources. All the interpretations, as we have noticed, contain an inadvertence150. The general functional assumption was that the king attacked Wallachia from multiple directions151. An army coming from Transylvania presumably entered through the place where the spring of river Ialomiţa was while another, led by the king, would have come from Bulgaria and tried to retrieve Severin. The objection is logical. What would the king have searched for in Bulgaria only to return to Severin afterwards? The only probable explanation is that the king intended to fight on two different fronts. An army, led by him personally, was going to re-establish the Hungarian suzerainty in the Bulgarian Banate from Vidin. Another army, led by the voivode of Transylvania had the mission to determine that the Romanian 143 Ibidem, p. 14. 144 DRH, D„ I, pp. 88-89. 145 DRH, D., I, pp. 93-94. The correct date of the document in Maria Hóiban, op. cit., p. 183, the note 98. 146 As Thallóczy L. claims , Nagy Lajos és a bulgăr bánság, in Századok, 34, 1900, p. 587. 147 Maria Hóiban, op. cit., p. 187, is wrong when he claims that the request for troops to support the Bulgarian bans was not part of the obligations currently held by the voivode. 148 DRH, D„ I, pp. 90-91. 149 Ibidem, pp. 91-93. 150 A different assumption, caused, among others, by the absence of knowledge concerning all the possible sources at that moment, was proposed by N. Iorga, Lupta pentru stăpânirea Vidinului, pp. 984-988. He placed the campaign against Wallachia in 1369, after Vladislav would have conquered Vidin. 151 Maria Hóiban, op. cit., pp. 188-193. After he analyses Thallóczy's and I. Minea's opinions, resorts to an exaggerated interpretation. Cf. şi Thallóczy L., op. cit., pp. 589 et passim; etc.
