Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 1. szám)
Relaţii internaţionale
The Political Relations between Wallachia and Hungary 29 voivode Vladislav Vlaicu would submit against to the Hungarian king. The cause of the failure of the Hungarian armies and Vladislav Vlaicu's victory can be explained only in this context: the royal army's division on two fronts, with two initially different targets. We must separate the basic information in the text of John of Târnave's chronicle as compared to the literary structure and, also, the advocating formulae used by the court chronicler152 153 *. Vladislav Vlaicu's victory is unquestionable. The Hungarian troops coming from Transylvania suffered a disaster. The Transylvanian voivode was killed along with other high noblemen and knights and the army was scattered. The initial success of the Hungarians at the citadel of Dâmboviţa, narrated by the chronicler, seems rather like a makeshift meant to soften the disaster of the Hungarian army. The same purpose is designed for the mentioning of the failure of the king's army to cross the Danube before the disaster suffered by the troops in Transylvania. The battle (or the battles) fought by the Transylvanian voivode's army and the Romanian army led by Dragomir (the title of count given by the chronicler is inappropriate) took place most probably in the midst of October 1368. Subsequent to the announcement of the king, who was in Bulgaria, he tried to cross the Danube so as that he should subdue the rebelling voivode. When did the king try to cross the Danube and, according to the chronicle, was stopped by Vladislav Vlaicu's Romanians? The fact that on the 12th of November 1368 the king's camp settled over the Danube, in front of the Severin citadel cannot be considered as a clue that he would have tried to cross the river, through that place and that, afterwards, the Romanian voivode would have stopped him. The attempt could have been anywhere on the Danube, from Vidin to Severin. Whereas the king issued a document from Severin'53 on the 14th of November, proof that he had succeeded in crossing the river. The progress of the fights in the Severin region during that period is certified by the complaints coming from the Romanian knezes of the Sebeş district to Benedict Himffy against the new requirements from 1369. The knezes said that from the moment "when that quarrel outburst" between the king and the Romanian voivode, they permanently kept at least two hundred people guarding the mountains, day and night, until winter came. Over the winter, a contingent of 500 soldiers "of the best ones" remained in the citadel of Mehadia, "until the return of our lord, the king"15*. The information of this document offers a series of clarifications concerning the progress of the events. The two sides fought for the Severin region. But if the Mehadia citadel was in the hands of the royal army, it is only natural to presume that Vladislav Vlaicu could, at the most, have kept the Severin citadel. 152 The critical text of Johannes de Thurocz's chronicle: Chronica Hungarorum, (ed. Elisabeth Galántai et Julius Kristó), I, Budapest. 1985, [§168], pp. 181-182. 153 P. Engel, Királyitineráriumok, p. 35. DRH, D., I, pp. 96-97: „...in montibus alpium semper ad minus ducentos homines propter illorum die ac node usque ad iemmem conservavimus; insuper nos cum quingentis hominibus colledis melioribus similiter usque ad reversionem domini noştri regis ibi in Mihald rnansimus...“.
