St. Louis és Vidéke, 1967 (55. évfolyam, 1-26. szám)

1967-12-29 / 26. szám

ST TOUTS T>S VTTtfKE TDR7 TYFrTriuowp oq THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY by Imre Kovács We are told by many of our Western friends as well as by the mass media that our countries in East Europe are no longer satel­lites, or captives. Some of them, such as Yugoslavia and, more re­cently, Rumania — have come to be regarded as „independent”; Po­land, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary are rated as „clients” rather than satellites of the Soviet Union. The satellite status is now reserved for only two countries: East Germany and Albania — the first being the satellite of the Soviet Union; the second, of Red China. The entire region is not even called „East Europe” any longer; it has again become „Cent­ral Europe”, which pleased us be­cause we always thought that geo­graphically ‘ and politically Russia (the Soviet Union) legitimately comprised East Europe, and we have never claimed that West Europe was not West Europe. There are two yardsticks for measuring the new moves and re­lations in the once monolithic Soviet bloc: de-stalinization, in­volving the relaxation of arbitrary methods; and de-satellization, or the loosening of ties with Moscow. It is neither my intention nor my duty here to elaborate on the actions of the Communist leader of de-satellization more admired by the West — the Rumanian, Nicolae Ceausescu; but I believe that it would be appropriate for me to analyze the situation in Communist Hungary, which was, and to a certain extent still is, the darling of the world press and of some corners of the academic world for her advanced stage of de-stalinization, reached under the leadership of the much-heralded János Kádár. We have heard such fantastic allegations as that in fact he is carrying out the program of the 1956 revolution which he de­serted and betrayed. I must state objectively that there was a brief lull in Hungarian developments when a few innocent steps were taken in the right direc­tion — towards more freedom in­ternally and more independence externally. This remarkable inter­mission lasted for a year or so, be­tween Khrushchev’s fall and the intensification of the war in Viet­nam. The Kádár-Khrushchev relation­ship was, indeed, uniqe. Beside the fact that the two men genuinely liked each other, for each of these ebullient Communist leaders, the other represented a mutually im­portant political investment. For Kádár, Khrushchev was a protec-Kovács Imre, az emigrációban élő kiváló író, politikus az alábbi jelentős angolnyelvü cikket küldte az ACEN vezetőségéhez, melyben a 20 éves kommunista uralom alatt lévő Magyarország jelenlegi helyzetét ismerteti és politikailag kiértékeli. tor, his ultimate guarantee of security and survival. The value of Kádár for Khrushchev was manifested by his successful ex­ample of reform-Communism on which the Soviet leader had stak­ed his very own career. As proof of his faithfulness and trustworthi­ness, Kádár never would have done anything considered harmful to the politics and interests of Khrushchev — and the Kremlin. When Khrushchev fell, Kádár paid an unusual tribute to him, an affectionate expression of love and respect. Then he turned, in a business-like manner, to the twin leadership of Brezhnev and Kosy­gin, but after October, 1964, Ká­dár became just another ally of the Soviet Union, surely not the most favored because of his close­ness to Khrushchev. It may have been its keen awareness of this situation which challenged the Ká­dár regime to seek openings and contacts in the free world. Foreign Minister János Péter visited Paris in January, 1965, declaring Hun­gary’s interest in the French idea of a „European Europe”. Kádár himself stated in Parliament at that time that „class struggle has not invalidated geography”, and that Hungary is a European coun­try. Radio Budapest admitted openly: „The cultural heritage of Europe is still a force in our cul­ture and civilization.” Then Mr. Péter went to Vienna and London, and met with Secretary Rusk in New York. His official visits were returned by some of the foreign ministers of the respective coun­tries he visited. The Hungarian Communists joyfully celebrated the end of their political quarantine in inflicted by UN resolutions and by adverse public opinion in Wes­tern countries as a reaction to the crushing of the Hungarian Revolu­tion in 1956. Relations with Austria were particularly brisk; high and low level exchanges of all sorts were pointing to a deliberate expansion of cooperation with Hungary’s closest Western neighbor and traditional historical partner. The cautious renewal of friend­ly relations with Austria prompted debates on long forbidden ques-AZ ÉLETBIZTOSÍTÁS OLYAN, MINT A TAKARÉKBETÉT! A bonUba betétre rakott pénz kamatosa« kamatozik. Bizton­ságba«, jó helyen van, de csak aszerint növekszik, ahogy időnként hozzáadunk. A biztosítási kötvény előre meghatározott összege, $4,000, $5,000, $10,000, $25,000, vagy nagyobb összeg egé­szen biztosan kifizetésre kerül annak kezeihez, akire kötvé­nyünket íratjuk, mert egy napon egészen biztosan meghalunk! És annyit nem fizetünk be a kötvényre havidijakban, amennyit a biztosító halálunk után a kedvezményezettnek kifizet! Egy 20 évig fizetendő u.n. "Endowment" kötvényért kevesebbet Űzetünk be 20 év alatt és a teljes megállapított összeget kap­juk vissza, azon felül az osztalékot is. ÁlUON KE ÖN IS TAGJAINK SORÁBA! Érdtktodfűtl mag ma a mi rendkívül előnyös életbiztosítási kötvényeink Wffl h«fyi képviselőnknél: DENNIS ACSAY — TELEFON: EV 2-5255 vsgy pedig közvetlenéi a Központi Hivatalnak WILLIAM PENN FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION #29 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219 WATCH FOR THE GOOD LOOKING STRANGER IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD for the new OPEL KADETT Németországban készül, a köztudottan elsőrendű német technikával. 30 mérföldet kap egy gallon benzinnel. Gazdaságos — Üzembiztos — Olcsó GILBERT BUICK, INC. 3510 GRAVOIS PR 1-5200 tions, such as the Habsburg Mo­narchy and the Danubian Federa­tion. Budapest was the site of one of the international historians’ conferences; the participants dis­cussed at length and in depth the “merits” and inherent sickness of the Austro—Hungarian Empire, especially during the period be­tween the turn of the century and those fateful October days of 1918. Reading the papers prepared by experts in various fields or the comments of the rank and file, one could not escape the feeling that their studies actually involved the fate of the Soviet Empire. In other words, their problem was to dis­cover how to avoid repeating the pattern of the collapse of empires in Central Europe; and possibly the problem further involved the re­placing of the present textures of interrelations with a more solid structure, maybe along the lines of the 1867 Ausgleich — the com­promise between the Magyars and the Habsburgs which put that shaky empire on a somewhat firm­er footing, at least for the remain­ing half century of its existence. More interesting was the debate on the Danubian Federation, in­dicating the search for a mutually acceptable solution on solid histo­rical and geographical grounds. When Lajos Kossuth and his fol­lowers failed to gain freedom and independence for Hungary from the Habsburgs in 1848-49, they de­veloped in their years of exile a plan for a Danubian Federation which was envisioned by others, too. Since the 1850s, the idea of a Danubian Federation has intrigued the more progressively minded Hungarians — I should say, in vain. Therefore, it was very natural that during the heyday of the re­cent Hungarian-Austrian flirtation, Communists and Magyars alike re­ferred to the idea of regionalism in Eastern Europe as a substitute for Soviet integration. Kádár himself proposed many times closer cooperation in Central Europe, using such arguments as this one: “The nations in the Danubian Basin live in a commu­nity of faith; they either get on together or perish together.” In my youth, during the thirties in Hungary, such an expression meant to us that between two milestones, the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, the peoples of Central Europe had to find a way to un­derstanding and cooperation, other­wise we would perish. But for Ká­dár and his comrades, the revived slogans of a Danubian Federation are very likely no more than a camouflaged expression of the in­tention to forge the region into tighter solidarity under Soviet rule; Kádár being always eager to remind everyone of the fact that Russia (the Soviet Union) is also a Danubian, a European country... The Hungarian Communist lead­ers possibly understand that the nature of the Soviet alliance has changed, that the Soviet Union is no longer the solitary center of the international Communist move­ment. They have come to realize that the days when Budapest could put all its eggs in Moscow’s basket are over. Nevertheless, the Hunga­rian Communists are convinced that there is alternative to an East­ern orientation and the continua­tion of the Soviet alliance. Under the impact of the growing poly­centrism in Communist relations, Kádár dutifully observed that “there has never been, and there never will be, an anti-Soviet Com­munism.” They were unable to exploit their gestures of the West because of the lack of durable Hungarian exchange goods. And as for work­ing both sides of the street, if such was their intention, the West did not create conditions for such a game. The escalation of the Viet­namese war provided the Hun­garian Communists with a good excuse for the restoration of their unconditional subservience to Mos­cow. The presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, and the country’s heavy economic dependence on the Soviet Union as the most import­ant source of raw material on one hand, and as the save market for her products on the other, has seal­ed the fate of Hungary. If no change should occur in in­ternational relations to break up the present Soviet order, in Central Europe, Hungary will remain a Soviet puppet, indeed a satellite, forever — which was emphasized recently by the new twenty-year treaty of friendship and mutual as­sistance signed in Budapest by Hungary and the Soviet Union. This treaty binds Hungary to the Soviet Union even more tightly than the one which it replaced. The Hungarian Communist re­gime is isolated from the world as well as from the Hungarian nation so completely that the stigma of non-representation could be in­delibly stamped on its facade. Párizs „diszkréten” váltja be devizatartalékait aranyra A francia fővárosban találgat­ják, vajon a kormány november­ben a font leértékelése és a dollár iránti bizalom csökkenése miatt erőteljesen megduzzadt valuta­készleteinek egy részét beváltja-e aranyra, hogy folytassa azt a né­hány éve követett gyakorlatot, amely szerint nem engedi meg, hogy a francia bank arany- és de­vizakészletében az arany aránya 90 százalék alá csökkenjen. Most hivatalosan bejelentették ugyanis Párizsban, hogy novemberben a Francia Bank tartalékai 334 millió dollárral emelkedtek és a hónap végén 6182 millió dollárra növe­kedtek. Mivel a növekedés túlnyomó ré­sze abból eredt, hogy igen sokan font-, illetve dollárkészleteiket a jelenlegi legszilárdabb nyugati va­luták közé számító francia frank­ra váltották be, jelentősen megnőtt a valutakészletek aránya az arany­hoz képest. A szabálynak tekintett 90 százalékos aranykészlet eléré­séhez körülbelül 250 millió dollár­nak megfelelő aranyra való bevál­tása lenne szükséges. Kempelen Farkas beszélőgépe újra megszólalt 1788-ban csodálatos beszélőgé­pet készített Kempelen Farkas, századának egyik legzseniálisabb feltalálója. A gép az ember beszé­lő szerveit utánozta. A hangokat lényegileg egy résből, illetve kü­lönböző segédrésekből lehetett ki­csalni, részint a fuvőshangszerek­­re emlékeztető billetyíízettel, ré­szint szabad kézzel. A fujtatőt, amely a levegőáramlást biztosítot­ta, könyökével nyomogatta az „előadó művész”. Kempelen 15 évi gyakorlás után mutatta be a nagyközönség előtt, hogyan beszél gépe angolul, fran­ciául és magyarul. Németül ke­vésbé ment a lecke, mert a beszé­det ezen a nyelven a hangösszeté­telek gyors egymásutánja megne­hezítette. Valószínű, hogy a gépből an­nakidején 2-3 példány készült. Ál­lítólag legutóbb előkerült valahol az egyik, s azt a hírek szerint most Bécsben őrzik. A többi biztosan elpusztult. Most pedig, 179 év elteltével egy francia kutató, Jean-Sylvain Lienard elkészítette a Kempelen­­féle beszélőgép mását. Műve, an­nál is „izgalmasabb” alkotás, mert készítője nem is látta az állítóla­gos bécsi példányt, kizárólag a Kempelen által 1791-ben írt „do­kumentáció” alapján dolgozott. Gépét Budapesten meg is szólal­tatta, természetesen franciául, s amint hallgatói megállapíthatták, a meglehetősen gyermekies hangú gép — stílszerűen — éppen a gyermeki nyelv leggyakoribb sza­vait ejtette ki a legtisztábban. Saving & Loan Association Home Office 14th & Cass Ave. Branch: Grand & Chippewa (Formerly Franklin S.&L. Ass’n) 12 DIFFERENT TYPES OF SAVINGS ACCOUNTS TO MEET YOUR NEEDS 5% on Savings Certificates Min. $5000 4%% on Passbook Accounts Accounts Insured by F.S.L.I.C. North St. Louis Trust Company Grand at Florissant GA 14070 Olcsó autó kölcsön $4.00 egy évre minden 100 dollár után Safe Deposit Box Teljes bankszolgálat Member F. D. I. C. JEFFERS0N­­GRAV0IS BANK OF ST. LOUIS 2604 S. Jefferson PR 1-8833 FULL BANKING SERVICE MEMBER F. D. I. C. 5»i kamatot fizetünk 12 hónapos Savings Certificate-re minimális betét 1,000 dollár Minden betét államilag biztosít­va van $15,000 erejéig. Drive-in banking daily from 8:15 to 6 p.m. WEBSTER GROVES TRUST COMPANY 75 W. LOCKWOOD Webster Groves, Mo. 63119 WO 1-2400 F.D.I.C. SOUTH SIDE NATIONAL BANK IN ST. LOUIS • Drive-Up bankszolgálat. • Egy megállással minden banki dolgát elintézi. • Keressen fel bennünket min­den banki ügyében. 3606 Gravois Ave. (Grand és Gravois sarkán) MEMBER FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. 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