Folia Theologica et Canonica 2. 24/16 (2013)
SACRA THEOLOGIA - Sebastian Walsh, O.Praem., “Fidelissimus Discipulus Eius”: Charles De Köninck’s Exposition of Aquinas’ Doctrine on the Common Good
136 SEBASTIAN WALSH, O.PRAEM. “Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would be separate from itself.” “No,” he replied, “for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.” “That,” said he, “is very neat Socrates; you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over many. Is that not about what you mean?” “Perhaps it is,” said Socrates. “Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?” “A part over each.” “Then,” said he, “the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would not be the whole, but only a part of each idea.” “So it appears.”6 The young Socrates, unacquainted with the distinct meanings of whole and part, falls back upon a better known sense of the word whole, after which He finds himself in a maze of contradictions. It is not surprising, therefore, that when there is talk of the common good, what comes first to mind is a kind of aggregate or sum of private goods. Indeed, this is one legitimate sense of the expression (for example, St. Thomas speaks of this kind of common good in relation to distributive justice7). But it is not the most profound or metaphysically important sense of common good. The sense of common good that we are after is that which is most of all the perfection of beings, especially persons, and which is the foundation for societies of persons. Explaining why the common good is not an aggregate or sum total of singular goods, De Köninck says: “The common good is greater not because it includes the singular good of all the singulars. In that case, it would not have the unity of the common good which comes from a certain kind of universality in the latter, but would merely be a collection, and only materially better than the singular good.”8 The good which is the foundation of society, on the other hand, is common as a perfective cause: one whose essence belongs to each member of the society. 6 Plato, Parmenides, 131b-c. Translated by Fowler, H. N. (Loeb Classical Library 167), Cambridge, Mass. 1977.213. 7 See, for example, S. Th., II-II, q.61, a. 1, ad. 1. 8 PCG, 16.
