Folia Theologica et Canonica 2. 24/16 (2013)
SACRA THEOLOGIA - Sebastian Walsh, O.Praem., “Fidelissimus Discipulus Eius”: Charles De Köninck’s Exposition of Aquinas’ Doctrine on the Common Good
“FIDELISSIMUS DISCIPULUS EIUS’ 137 'The common good is not a good other than the good of the particulars, a good which is merely a good of the collectivity looked upon as a kind of singular. In that case, it would be common only accidentally; properly speaking it would be singular (...) But when we distinguish the common good from the particular good, we do not mean thereby that it is not the good of the particulars; if it were not, then it would not be truly common.”9 Confusion of a good which is common as a collection and a good which is common as a cause perfecting the particulars to which it is communicated can result in serious errors. De Köninck identifies totalitarianism as one of these errors: “In totalitarian regimes, the common good is singularized, and it is opposed as a more powerful singular to the singulars which are purely and simply subjected. The common good loses its distinctive character; it becomes alien. It becomes subordinate to this monster of modern invention which is called the State (...).”10 Also to be avoided is the confusion of the common good as a cause, which is a potential whole, with the good common only according to predication.11 The name “good” can be said of many individuals, and this is to be common, or universal, in predication. This is an instance of a universal whole. On the other hand, the good can be a real, determinate being and a universal cause in things. This is an instance of a potential or potestative whole. The good which is universal in predication is less distinct and determinate, than the specific goods receiving the universal name “good.” In contrast, the good which is a cause and a potestative whole is the reason for the determination and specificity in the goods it causes. For example, the good of victory determines completely the order and movements of all the parts of the army. These orders and movements are themselves certain intermediate goods caused by the determinate victory toward which they are ordained: each one is chosen only to the extent that it seems to lead to the good of victory. The common good which, according to De Köninck, is of most interest to the wise man, that good which is the foundation for the society of rational beings and the whole order of the universe, is a good common as a cause and potential whole,12 taking potential here in the sense of an active power. As St. Thomas teaches: 9 PCG, 17. 10 PCG, 66. One thinks immediately of the Leviathan of Hobbes, whom De Köninck most certainly had in mind as he wrote this passage. 11 On this distinction see MacArthur, R., Universal in Praedicando, Universal in Causando, in Laval Théologique et Philosophique XVIII/1 (1962) 59-95. 12 See, for example, DST, 233.
