Tanulmányok Budapest Múltjából 29. (2001)

A BUDAI KIRÁLYI VÁR ÉS A VÁRNEGYED MINT KATONAI ERŐDÍTMÉNY - Kedves Gyula: A budai vár szerepe az 1849. évi tavaszi hadjáratban 161-168

féle bomba és gránát, 8760 db különböző típusú katonai puska, 2829 db puskacső, 7288 db szurony, 2155 db polgári puska. Az igaz, hogy a császári csapatok rendezésében igen jó szolgálatot tett a vár ostromára irányuló hadművelettel eltöltött hosszú idő, s ebből a szempontból Weiden legbölcsebb döntésének bizonyult a budavári helyőrség hátrahagyása. A fentiekben írtak alapján azt is látnunk kell azonban, hogy a honvédsereg számára ennél jobb, megvalósítható cél aligha létezett. Ezt a célt pedig teljesítette, vitézül harcolva, megbirkózva olyan műszaki problémák megoldásával is, amilyennel korábban nem találkozott. GYULA KEDVES THE ROLE OF BUDA CASTLE IN THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF 1849 Summary The general attack launched in December 1848 by the imperial army to crush the Magyar revolution put the Hungarian capital into a strategic position. The imperial supreme commanders made Buda the number-one target of their manoeuvres, hoping that by capturing it they would ultimately quash the revolution, too. They failed to accomplish that merely by taking the capital, because the Hungarian military commanders only eventually gave up Buda and Pest in order to concentrate the Hungarian forces. The moment the Hungarian armies were capable, they immediately launched a counter-attack to recapture the capital. In phase 1 and 2 of the spring campaign (the Gödöllő and the Komárom operations) the Hungarian army won victory after victory against the main body of the imperial army. Although it was able to drive the Habsburgs out of central Hungary, it was never able to gain the upper hand. The Hungarian army, however, lacked manpower and resources, in short, the conditions for successfully continuing its offensive. The country's new revolutionary leadership had promised significant reinforcements, so the Hungarian commanders decided in late April to wait. Giving military considerations priority, they decided in the meantime on besieging Buda castle, which, in effect, was in line with revolutionary politics, too. The idea was to most effectively use an involuntary interval in the army's operations. It was not, therefore, a change of strategy; they did not give up the idea of leading an offensive to liberate the west country. Rather, it was that very offensive they sought to prepare the ground for. The imperial commanders left behind significant garrison troops in the captured Buda castle with the intention of curbing the Hungarians' offensive. That proved to be one of Welden's most fortunate decisions. This fact notwithstanding, the widespread claim, that the Hungarian army's siege of Buda and the time "wasted" there accounted for the balance of advantage ultimately going to the imperial army, cannot be supported. The Hungarian commanders are not to blame for deciding on that strategy; it was the best thing they could do under the given circumstances. There was, however, much oversight in executing the manoeuvre, and the fault of failing to adequately prepare the siege of Buda castle lay chiefly with the Hungarian military leadership.