Nyelvtudományi Közlemények 84. kötet (1982)
Tanulmányok - Szende Tamás: Többértelműség és célzás [On Semantic Polyvalence, Ambiguity, and Hinting] 203
TÖBBÉRTELMŰSÉG ËS CÉLZÁS 219 COLE, P. 1978: On the origins of referential opacity. P. COLE (szerk.), Syntax and Seman-tics 9. Pragmatics. New York—San Francisco—London. 1—22. DOMBRÁDY, G. 1980: Das Schweigen in der dichterischen Sprache — das Schweigen als Sprache. (A „Korunk kommunikációs zavarai" c. konferencia előadás-anyagai.) DONNELLAN, K. 1966: Référence and definite descriptions. Philosophical Review 75: 281—304. DONNEIXAN, K. 1978: Speaker référence, descriptions and anaphora. P. COLE (szerk.), Syntax and Semantics 9. Pragmatics New York—San Francisco—London. 47—68. FREGE, G. 1980: Fogalom és tárgy. RÚZSA IMRE (szerk.), Logika, szemantika, matematika. Budapest. 135—55. (Eredetije: Über Begriff und Gegenstand 1892-ben jelent meg.) HINTIKKA, J. 1962: Knowledge and belief. Ithaca, New York. (Idézi HORN 1978.) HORN, L. 1978: Remarks on neg-raising. P. COLE (szerk.), Syntax and Semantics 9. Pragmatics. New York—San Francisco—London. 129—220. KAPLAN, D. 1978: Dthat. P. COLE (szerk.), Syntax and Semantics 9. Pragmatics. 221—243. LEONTIEVA, N. 1980 : On the semantic incompleteness of sentence. „Automatische Sprachverarbeitung — 23—28. 3. 1980 — Potsdam". Potsdam. (Lapszám nélkül.) LYONS, J. 1978: Semantics I—II. Cambridge—London—New York—Melbourne. (Első kiadás: 1977.) MACKAY, D. 1970: Mental diplopia: Towards a model of speech perception at the semantic levél. G. D'ARCAIS—W. LEVÉLT (szerk.), Advances in Psycholinguistics. Amsterdam—London. 76—100. MCCAWLEY, J. 1978: Conversational implicature and the lexicon. P. COLE (szerk.), Syntax and Semantics 9. Pragmatics. New York—San Francisco—London. 245— 259. MORGAN, J. 1978: Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. P. COLE (szerk.), Syntax and Semantics 9. Pragmatics. New York—San Francisco—London. 261— 280. QÜTNE, W. V. O. 1968: A logika módszerei. RTJZSA IMRE (szerk.), Budapest. (Eredetije: Methods of logic, 1963-ban jelent meg.) SADOCK, J. 1974: Toward a linguistic theory of speech acts. New York. SZABOLCSI ANNA 1980: Az aktuális mondattagolás szemantikájához. NyK 82: 59—82. SZENDE TAMÁS 1982: A közlési zavarok elméletének alapkategóriája: az 'általánossal való helyettesítés'. Magyar Filozófiai Szemle 26. (Közlés alatt.) WITTGENSTEIN, L. 1969: Philosophische Untersuchungen. L. WITTGENSTEIN: Schriften 1. Frankfurt. (Eredetije német és angol nyelven: Oxford 1953.) On Semantic Polyvalence, Ambiguity, and Hinting by TAMÁS SZENDE Semantic polyvalence, ambiguity, and opacity — the latter mostly discussed in terms of modal logic in the field — are concerned with pragmatic aspects and various types of ambiguity occurring in language usage. The following terms or rather principles have been taken intő considération as starting points: (i) distinction between 'sense [Sinn]' and 'référence [Bedeutung]' which dérives from FREGE (1892); (ii) interrelations between the set of states-of-affairs (X = {xlf x 2 , • • ., xn}) and the set of individual expression forms called here 'speech events' (E = {e^ e2, . . ., en}) into which the former will be transformed; (iii) probabilistic values (pa, pb, • . ., Pn) assignedto the alternative possible interprétations of one and the same communicative event in a given situation s». After having briefly reviewed the problem of how it is possible that semantic polyvalence does not always and necessarily resuit in ambiguity, taking the latter as a special case of communicative events in the context of interpersonally determined interpretation/cognition processes, the following définitions are given. (i) Ambiguity émerges in case a speech event a refers to two or more states-ofaffairs Xa, Xb, • • -, Xm in a given communicative situation s% or ei admits xi to be interpreted as one of the x%lf xi 2 , . . ., Xim variants of the state-of-affairs xi when the sensical différence among them turns out to be of relevance later on during communication. (ii) Ambiguity represents an optional communicative value of a in the sense that it holds in si without necessarily doing the same in sj whenever the wt [world] and/or ti [time] parameters of et are not identical with WJ and/or tj of the same speech event (ej = a) occurring in SJ.
