Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43. (1993) - Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 65. Geburtstag

WILLIAMSON, Samuel R. Jr.: Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna's Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914

delegation had ever left St. Petersburg, the two allies were able to shape the broad outlines of their policy for the approaching crisis. The surviving evidence of the Franco-Russian talks has never been convincing; this interpretation makes the residual evidence even more suspect.14)

But another ramification, though unknown to Vienna, had a far more profound impact upon Habsburg hopes for a successful move against Belgrade. The Russians almost certainly informed Belgrade of the tenor of the Italian telegram. Unfortunately, and suspiciously, there are substantial gaps in the surviving documents of cable and diplomatic dispatches between Belgrade and St. Petersburg from mid-June to mid-July. This gap has never been explained, and interestingly, does not exist after 25 July. In any event, and based on a number of sources in addition to the information presumably from Russia, Serbian Prime Minister Nikolai Pasié on 18 July alerted Serbian missions that Belgrade would tolerate no Habsburg infringement on Serbian sovereignty. Thereafter the Pasié position hardened and become more determined. Thus, it could be argued, the German indiscretions meant that Vienna had lost the chance of surprise in Belgrade as well. This information may also explain Serbia’s success in a drafting a reply to the Austrian ultimatum that appeared to concede much while in fact yielding almost nothing on the crucial points. Perhaps, given the experiences of 1992-1993 with Serbian assurances, Vienna correctly gauged from the start the chances of their being honored.15)

The indiscretions also impacted upon the Triple Alliance. Throughout July Berchtold resisted German pressures to yield something to Rome and thereby assure that the southern ally would rally to the cause. Vienna refused these entreaties and became even more obstinate after discovery of the Italian cables. Nor did Vienna’s caution end there. The Germans found themselves less well informed by Berchtold, despite the approaching climax of the crisis. No further details reached Berlin of Habsburg plans. Even the draft of the ultimatum, which the Germans apparently thought they would see well in advance, reached the German capital only as a virtual fait accompli. Berchtold wanted no additional risks of indiscretion.14 15 16)

The Consequences of Vienna’s Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914

14) See Szápáry to Berchtold, 18 July (tel.) and 21 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, VIII, nos. 10365 and 10461.

15) Pasié to all missions (except Vienna), 18 July (tels.) 1914, in Serbia, Documents sur la politique exterieure du Royaume de Serbie, 1903-1914 [Documenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, 1903-1914], eds. Vladimir Dedijer and Zivota Anié, VII (2) (Belgrade, 1980), no. 462. A study of Serbian decision making in the July crisis remains to be written; for some insights, see David MacKenzie, Apis: The Congenial Conspirator: The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic (New York, 1989).

16) Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins, pp. 199-204.

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