Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43. (1993) - Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 65. Geburtstag

WILLIAMSON, Samuel R. Jr.: Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna's Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914

Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.

This interpretation of the mid-point of the 1914 crisis may help to put some of the subsequent July events into a more coherent perspective. In the first place, Franco-Russian cooperation emerges as far more coordinated and deliberate than has often been assumed. Rather than having French ambassador Maurice Paléologue apparently exceed his authority, as has often been argued, this interpretation suggests that the French ambassador in St. Petersburg was only doing what had already been agreed upon by Poincaré and Premier René Viviani during their visit.17) This analysis also explains the promptness of the Russian military measures that began almost the moment the ultimatum reached Belgrade on 25 July. Without waiting to see whether Austria-Hungary would break relations with Serbia, the Russians ordered a series of military preparations which they hoped would, as in the fall of 1912, convince Vienna not to go to war. In this instance the Austrian intelligence apparatus failed to discern early enough, though Berlin did, the extent of the Russian steps. This failure led Conrad to order his forces toward the Balkans prematurely in late July, only to retrain them later and send them to confront the Russians. This would only be the first of Conrad’s many failures during the war.18)

Another by-product" of the indiscretion centered upon German attempts to localize the crisis. From the start Berlin had seen the need for localization. But it hoped that this localization might be accepted by Russia and France from the start. While the Germans had anticipated problems with St. Petersburg, the rapidity and extent of the Russian actions (even before 30 July and Russian general mobilization) meant that Berlin lost a chance to exert more effective control over the outcome of the crisis. Not surprisingly, the delay enabled the Triple Entente to stress Habsburg duplicity during July. The delay, the deception, the disclaimers could all be used to brand Vienna and Budapest as unworthy of trust, as a state bent on war at any cost. Thus the loss of surprise for the Habsburgs in the July crisis exacerbated a situation which might, had the action come earlier in July, have won a measure of tolerance from a badly divided government in London and perhaps elsewhere.

There were additional consequences for Berchtold and Conrad. Because the Franco-Russian group reacted so quickly, the Austro-Hungarian

17) For a critique of Paléologue, see Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, II, chap. 13.

18) On the Russian military moves, see Spalajkovic to Pasié, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 July (tels.) 1914, Documents Serbie, VII (2), nos. 503, 559, 570, 584-5, 598, 663, 673. The author is grateful to Dragan Zivojinovic of the University of Belgrade for help with the Serbian documents. Also Ulrich von Trumpener, “War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914”, Central European History, IX (March 1976), pp. 66-85.

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