Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43. (1993) - Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 65. Geburtstag

WILLIAMSON, Samuel R. Jr.: Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna's Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914

Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.

Far more serious were the ramifications of Berlin’s indiscretion. On 11 July Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow had telegraphed Hans von Flotow, the German ambassador to Rome, with an assessment of the Balkan crisis. Jagow left no doubt that Vienna intended to act. Given this prospect, Flotow was to inform Italian Foreign Minister Antonio di San Giuliano in general terms about the impending moves. When they met on 14 July, Flotow went further and the Italian statesman drew the obvious conclusion: that Austria-Hungary intended to attack Serbia. The Italian leader lost no time in seeking some assurances from Vienna; in fact, the Germans joined in pressing the Austrians to be more agreeable to Italian sensibilities in an effort to win their neutrality and/or support against Serbia. And San Giuliano immediately drafted a cable that went to St. Petersburg, Belgrade, Paris, and Vienna, warning of the threat posed by Vienna. What Berchtold had sought to conceal was becoming unraveled.12)

By 20 July (and probably two days earlier) Count Berchtold realized the nature of the German indiscretion. The Habsburg code experts, among the best in Europe, had easily broken the Italian code. The Italian document, with its multiple addresses, revealed the extent of the German damage. More importantly, the Ballhausplatz could surmise that the Italian envoys to St. Petersburg and to Belgrade would reveal the contents of the cable to the local governments. In any case, the Russian code experts, who were already breaking the Habsburg code, had no trouble it appears with the Italian one either. The evidence for this remains circumstantial, and perhaps forever so.13 * 15)

But the tenor of Russian dealings with Vienna changed perceptibly after the Italian telegram reached St. Petersburg. On 18 July Russian Foreign Minister Serge Sazonov pressed Habsburg ambassador, Friedrich von Szápáry, about Vienna’s intentions in the Balkans. On this occasion Szá- páry appeared successfully to convince the Russian leader that Vienna planned nothing unusual. Three days later French President Raymond Poincaré sought out the Habsburg envoy and left no doubt of France’s support of Russia and Russia’s support of Serbia. Thus, before the French

12) Jagow to Flotow, 11 July (tel.) 1914, K.D., no. 55; San Giuliano to Paris, Vienna,

St. Petersburg, and Belgrade, 16 July(tels.) 1914, Italian Foreign Ministry, I Documenti Diplomádéi Italiani, 4th ser., XII (Rome, 1964), no. 272. Also see the notes on pp. 494-95

in ÖUA, VIII, and Mérey to Berchtold, 18 July (tel.)1914, ibid., no. 10564.

15) Berchtold informed Mérey by telegram on 20 July 1914 that the Austrians knew “Aus geheimer sicherer QueUe” that the Germans had indeed been indiscreet, ÖUA, VIII, no 10418; also see Berchtold’s references to signals information in a communication to the Berliner Monatshefte, VII (1928), pp. 992—1004. Forgách to Mérey, 16 July 1914, quoted in Hantsch, Berchtold, I. p. 595, had noted “our secret source”.

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