Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43. (1993) - Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 65. Geburtstag
WILLIAMSON, Samuel R. Jr.: Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna's Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914
Tisza’s opposition certainly occurred during the period of Habsburg procrastination. But did Tisza actually cause the week’s delay? The evidence can be interpreted several ways. Perhaps the most compelling interpretation dovetails with the next explanation: that Berchtold did not rush to overcome the Magyar’s opposition because of the harvest leave issue. In any event, Berchtold moved carefully and not with haste to bring Tisza to agreement. If the argument about German support did not sway the Hungarian premier, the warnings about the possible Rumanian threat to Transylvania, backed by Serbia, were more suasive. And István Burián, Tisza’s agent in Vienna, strongly backed a military solution. Finally on 14 July, Tisza agreed to a policy that would lead to war. He did so with the explicit assurance that no additional Balkan land would be added to the monarchy, hence no more Slavs. With his conversion Tisza soon became one of the most ardent of those wishing to avenge the murders of a couple for whom in life there been no love and scant respect. But the evidence that best explains the Habsburg failure to act immediately centers upon the organizational structure of the Habsburg military forces. Students of the July crisis have often noted concern over the harvest of the crops. Yet this observation needs far more elaboration in the case of the Habsburg government, since the harvest issue directly thwarted Conrad’s ability to act decisively and quickly. Early in his career as chief of the general staff, Conrad had instituted the policy of harvest leaves that allowed active duty troops to travel to their homes in mid-summer for the harvest. These soldiers would then return to their active duty units after the harvest and complete the summer maneuvers. In the first days of July 1914 Conrad surveyed the deployment of Habsburg military forces; he then discovered the organizational impact of harvest leaves. On 6 July his aides reported that substantial parts of the units at Zagreb (Agram), Cracow, Timisoara (Temesvár), Innsbruck, Budapest, Graz, and Bratislava (Pressburg), among others, were away on leave. Those leaves were scheduled to start ending in mid-July and be completed by 25 July. Conrad ordered all future harvest leaves canceled. But he decided not to cancel the existing leaves; that decision in turn meant that the ultimatum would be delayed. To revoke the leaves would not only interfere with the harvests, it would cause massive confusion on the rail lines and possibly disrupt the mobilization plans. To revoke them would also signal to all the European governments that Vienna intended to escalate the crisis. Any remaining chances of surprise would thus be lost. Better to let the leaves expire and then act. This timing parameter set the framework for subsequent Habsburg decision making. The Consequences of Vienna’s Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914 171
