Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43. (1993) - Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 65. Geburtstag

WILLIAMSON, Samuel R. Jr.: Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna's Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914

Samuel H. Williamson, Jr.

The Kriegsarchiv has the tell-tale chart with the harvest leave dates marked. Conrad’s own memoirs hint but not directly at the impact of the problem. It can be surmised, however, that the general informed the Common Ministerial Council on 7 July when he briefed them on the military planning; the details of that briefing, understandably, were not included in any of the minutes.

The consequences of this little noted fact helps to explain the almost languid pace with which Berchtold dealt with Tisza’s opposition. The foreign minister knew he had to be ready for action at some point after 21 July. But until that point, he would have time to maneuver with the Magyar leader. The fact of the harvest leave delay thus makes Wiesner’s dispatch to Sarajevo understandable, since his efforts would not be pivotal in deciding when the monarchy would act.7)

But there was another event that crisscrossed the harvest leave problem: the impending and long-scheduled French state visit to Russia. Recognized as a possible problem early in the crisis, the full import of the visit did not become clearer until mid-July when Vienna learned more precisely about the plans of the French delegation to leave St. Petersburg. That date, 23 July, meant that Berchtold would have to delay the ultimatum until then or risk having the French leadership in St. Petersburg when the Serbians were given the ultimatum. The French state visit thus added at least two further days to the delay.8)

By waiting to let the French state visit be completed, Berchtold and the Habsburg policymakers became entrapped in the full ramifications of Conrad’s harvest leave. Lost forever would be the chance for prompt, decisive action that might just win the acquiescence of the European powers. Equally frustrating, the delays meant that the Ballhausplatz had to prevent any indiscretions which might reveal Vienna’s and Budapest’s true intentions. This problem necessitated an elaborate scenario of deception, an effort marred by the foibles of Berchtold and by Berlin’s mounting restiveness as the German leadership grasped the meaning of its support for Vienna. The convergence of these two developments - Habsburg indiscretions and German second thoughts - would in turn alert the Triple Entente powers to the impending denouement of the crisis even before the ultimatum was delivered. This information thus gave Belgrade and the Entente capitals time to adjust their policies accordingly.

7) General Staff memorandum, “Vorbereitende Massnahmen”, no date but seen by Conrad on 6 July 1914, Generalstab Operations Büro, Fasz. 43, Kriegsarchiv, Vienna. Also see Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1916, 5 vols. (Vienna, 1921-25), IV, pp. 30-78.

8) Otto Czemin to Berchtold, 15 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, VIII, no. 10291.

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