Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43. (1993) - Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 65. Geburtstag

WILLIAMSON, Samuel R. Jr.: Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna's Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914

Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.

problem, with the understanding that Vienna would make the final decision. Given these attitudes, no pressure from Berlin was necessary to prod the Habsburg leadership to action. To be sure, German support remained important, a point that Berchtold exploited in his efforts to convince Tisza of the need for action. But the first initiative rested with Vienna, not vice-versa.

There was, interestingly, a by-product of the German support that strengthens the Fischer position. The longer Vienna delayed, the more restive Berlin became, not for action per se but because Vienna would miss the favorable tide of European opinion. Therefore Berlin pressed Vienna on when action would come. The documentary survival of these overtures has become, for some, evidence of German coercion of the Habsburgs. The reverse is probably closer to the truth; the Germans were perplexed at Vienna’s failure to take advantage of the element of surprise in its showdown with Belgrade.5)

Tisza’s opposition to an immediate attack on Serbia has also been a part of the explanation for the Habsburg delay. Certainly the Magyar leader did not initially favor military action. In early July he opposed all talk of a surprise attack, so much desired by Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. Nor did Tisza conceal his reservations from Franz Joseph. Moreover, in conversations with Berchtold before and during the Common Ministerial Council on 7 July, Tisza opposed a military solution. He preferred instead to force a diplomatic reckoning with Belgrade; then, if that failed, more violent means could be considered. Yet by the end of the Council’s second session on 7 July, Tisza clearly realized his isolation. And while he threatened to use Hungary’s special Ausgleich status to veto action, this threat did not sway Berchtold or the others in their determination to act. Franz Joseph read Tisza’s memorandum of 8 July, urging caution but remained committed to action. Still, not until 14 July would the Magyar statesman finally accept the need for action, a week after the critical Council meeting in Vienna.6)

5) 5. E.g., Hans von Schoen to Georg Hertling (Munich), 18 July 1914, reprinted in Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914, ed. Imanuel Geiss, vol. I, (Hannover, 1963), no. 138.

6) Tisza to Franz Joseph, 8 July 1914, Austria, Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, eds. Ludwig Bittner and Hans Übersberger, 9 vols. (Vienna, 1930), VIII, no. 10146; also see Galántai, Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie, pp. 251-276; Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold: Grandseigneur und Staatsmann, 2 vols. (Graz, 1963); Gabor Vennes, István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist (New York, 1985), pp. 221-235; Williamson, Austria-Hungary, pp. 197-201.

170