Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955 idea of neutralisation would have a strong appeal to the Austrians, I think its appeal would be much less to the Germans ... In practise, of course, we are unlikely to get an Austrian settlement unless there is a German settlement. While a neutralisation of Germany could never be accepted without a reversal of Western policy, the same could not be said of Austria35 36). Dennis Allen, the head of the Central Department agreed. He doubted that „in practise the effects in Germany of a neutralisation of Austria need be so serious as the French fear“56). One had to be careful and not fall into the trap of „what goes for Austria goes for Germany.“ Frank Roberts, the brilliant Under Secretary in the Foreign Office responsible for Germany, argued that the Soviet Union wanted to hold the Austrian (and the Soviet zone of Germany) cards „until they can bargain them against western concessions over Germany“37). But the British realized by October 1953 that they could hardly oppose Austrian neutrality. Demilitarization of Austria would be worse, argued William Strang. In the event that the Soviets might make neutrality the price for the Austrian Treaty Strang noted that the Austrian government would be sorely tempted - the idea of a neutral policy ä la Suisse certainly attracts them and Gruber has already said in public that after a Treaty, Austria would enter no military coalitions. In such a situation, concluded Strang, the British position should be: „While we should oppose any Soviet proposals for the neutralization of Austria, we should be prepared in the last resort to accept a statement of neutrality by the Austrian Government in suitable terms“38). Before the Berlin Council of Foreign Ministers then, the British line essentially was to strictly oppose a demilitarisation of Austria and to resist Soviet proposals for the neutralisation of Austria39). At the same 35) Hancock minute, 24 May 1953, PRO, FO 371/103762/CA 1071/137. 36) Allen minute, 13 May 1953, PRO, FO 371/103762/CA 1071/123. 37) Roberts minute, 22 May 1953, PRO, FO 371/103762/CA 1071/137. 38) Strang to Roberts, 31 October 1953, PRO, FO 371/103768/CA 1071/303. Strang clarfied the position for Roberts, who participated in the Paris Tripartite Official Talks on the agenda for a future Council of Foreign Ministers. Roberts had wondered what the official position was on a neutralization of Austria, Roberts to Strang, 24 October 1953, ibid. 39) In his letter to Roberts (see above footnote), Strang also mentioned an Eden meeting with the Relgian Ambassador van Zeeland on October 13, in which van Zeeland mentioned: ,,’il pourrait prévoir la démilitarisation complete de l’Autriche’. As a result of the private talk which the Secretary of State had with Mr. Dulles and M. Bidault on October 16 about the Van Zeeland proposals, the Secrtary of State instructed me inter 377
