Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

Günter Bischof

time „a statement of neutrality by the Austrian Government in suitable terms“ was acceptable as a last resort.

The Americans had their usual internal disagreements on the question of Austrian neutrality. The Policy Planning Staff in the State Department opposed the inclusion of „an undertaking“ of Austrian neutrality in the State Treaty „because it might serve as a precedent for the German peace treaty and prevent a united Germany from joining EDC, as we presume might be Germany’s desire and intent.“ However, the memorandum continued that „thought might be given to a an arrangement whereby Austria, if it so pleases, could give an undertaking, not within the treaty itself, but of a kind having treaty force.“ An Austrian declaration, for example, in connection with its acceptance of UN membership might be one such possibility40). The Policy Planning Staff, like the British Foreign Office, felt that a declaration of Austrian neutrality, as long as it was not written into the Treaty, would be acceptable as a fallback position in the last resort.

Basic disagreements emerged in the National Security Council between the Pentagon and the State Department leadership41). Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the powerful Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed in an October NSC meeting the military’s „great anxiety“ about a neutralization of Austria. He noted that „a neutralized Austria would greatly weaken us in Europe.“ Radford particularly feared the effects of a neutralization of Austria on Germany, and „a neutralized Germany would be much more serious“42).

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not agree. In his answer to Radford, Dulles expressed a view that was very similar to the British. If the Austrians wanted to become neutral in return for a Treaty, the Americans hardly could stop them. He, too, was against neutralization, but „the decision in the long run would depend on the Austrians themselves.“ Dulles concluded that if the Americans refused to sign the

alia to tell the Belgian Ambassador that the three Foreign Ministers did not like the suggestion about Austria.“

40) Memorandum by Beam of the Policy Planning Staff to the Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Knight), 28 September 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 VII/2 1901-2. For a more detailed discussion of State Department views on a neutralization of Austria, see Rauchensteiner Die Zwei 210-16.

41) In 1949, the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom had gone through a similar controversy over the signing of an Austrian State Treaty; in the end President Truman had to resolve the issue himself, see Audrey Kurth Cronin Eine verpasste Chance? Die Grossmächte und die Verhandlungen im Jahre 1949 in Bevormundete Nation, ed. by Bischof/Leiden- frost 347-70.

42) Memorandum of Discussion of the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 October 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 VII/2 1911. On the U.S. military see also Rauchen- steiner Die Zwei 217-19.

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