Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)

SAPPER, Christian: Die Zahlamtsbücher im Hofkammerarchiv (1542–1825)

Rezensionen

523

The alliance of Throne and Altar was more seriously threatened by the crisis over the revolutions in Italy after 1820. The Pope and Consalvi were willing enough to see Austria suppress these revolutions; but they were unwilling to accept the almost inevitable concomitant of Austrian military action - the strengthening of Austrian influence in Italy to an extent where it impinged on Papal independence. Here again, Metternich was perhaps not entirely to blame: the garrisonning of Papal cities during the course of the operations against Naples was demanded by the Austrian military authorities. But Metternich connived at their activities; and his efforts — particularly at the Congress of Verona - to compel the Italian governments to fight revolution by a combination of reform and repression according to his own prescription alarmed the Papacy and dealt an irremediable blow to the working relationship between Metternich and Consalvi. Verona was perhaps Austria’s best, and last, chance to reinforce her influence in Italy and to coerce the Italian states into adopting the firm but enlightened policies that might - and only might - have saved them. Certainly circumstances were never to be so favourable again. As it was, Metternich, distracted by weightier issues in Greece and Spain, failed to press the issue and the Italian states, priding themselves on their demonstration of independence, proceeded blindly along the road that led to 1859.

With the triumph of the Zelanti in the Papal election of 1823 Austro-Papal relations cooled even further. Austrian observers considered ‘the whole trend of the regime ... retrograde ... aimed at restoring the state of affairs of a century or more ago’, but Metternich was helpless: ‘it is not to a government such as that of Leo XII that we can seek to offer advice’. The early attempts of Lammenais to steer the Pope towards an alliance with a popular religious movement seemed to the Austrians even more alarming: ‘the apotheosis of Gregory VII and a defence of his principles’, portending a direct clash between the Vatican and Josephinism that would utterly destroy the alliance of Throne and Altar. Metternich was certainly relieved when in 1826, impressed by the furore Lammenais had stirred up in France, by increasing revolutionary activity in the Papal states, and by Austrian warnings, Leo at last broke with Lammenais. The Pope’s continuing resistance to anything smacking of reform, and his blind reliance for salvation on Austrian bayonets seemed to Metternich distinctly lesser evils.

The election of the Austrophile Pius VIII in 1829 even offered some hope of progress in the field of reform, although Metternich and the Pope agreed on the need to build slowly on well-prepared foundations. Unfortunately for them there was no time for this. The July revolution in Paris both raised radical hopes in the Papal states and offered the chance of French protection against Austrian militaiy intervention. The death of Pius VHI at this juncture, followed by a paralysing two-month interregnum, led to the revolutionary disturbances that will form the starting point for R’s second volume. The relations between Austria and the Papacy 1815-1830 are of more than local significance. As the author points out, they illuminate the whole problem facing ‘modem counter-revolutionary Powers’ seeking to prevent revolution by forcing weak and reactionary regimes to reform, but finding themselves in the end confronted with ‘the dismal choice between tolerating the victory of revolution, and a risky military intervention to save an incompe