Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
176 Keith Wilson any friendship between Austria and the Entente Powers would have the slightest effect on Austrian policy in the event of a great international crisis: ‘Austria is already bound hand and foot to Germany, and nothing that she can say or do will unloose her bonds, unless the day comes for the Triple Alliance to be denounced.’ As he had frequently maintained in other contexts, it was British policy to maintain that Alliance, which in its enfeebled state was regarded as a mainstay of the peace of Europe32). Cartwright denied that he thought it either possible or desirable to draw away Austria from her alliance with Germany. All he contemplated, he professed, was that ‘we may succeed by rendering little services and by showing proofs of friendship to her to lay little ties between Austria-Hungary, ourselves, France and Italy, and perhaps finally Russia, which, in a critical moment, may counteract the great pull from Berlin, and, paralysing Austria-Hungary, cause her to hesitate taking sides in a great European struggle until the issue has been practically decided’33). There were no major exchanges on these alternative lines of approach for a few months. In April 1910, ä propos the Austrian dreadnoughts, Cartwright repeated Aehrenthal’s disclaimer: ‘je fais de la politique austro-hongroise pure et simple, comme j ’admire que vous fassiez de la politique purement anglais’34). Then, in June 1910, Cartwright produced another long despatch, in which he asserted that the terms of diplomatic trade had already changed: ‘It is now Berlin which has to consult Vienna quite as much, and perhaps more, them Vienna which has to consult Berlin on international questions, and if matters continue as they are doing at present, we may expect in a few years to see Austria-Hungary raised to a position of real equality with Germany in the Dual Alliance ... If the relations between Austria and these three powers [France, England and Russia] are good, and the Austro-Hungarian army is strong, the Dual Monarchy will before long play a dominant role in Central Europe, and that role will be that of a peacemaker rather than that of a dictator, as Germany tries to be’35). He followed this up with a portrayal to Hardinge of Aehrenthal as ‘a strong man . . . showing less and less fear of Berlin’, and again claimed ‘Knowledge of this must act as a drag on any aggressive, policy of Germany in a direction which does not interest Austria-Hungary. The way lies open for the rapid emancipation of Austria-Hungary from her long tutelage to Germany, and it seems to me that so long as the Austro-German alliance lasts, it is better for France and England that its external policy should be directed from Vienna rather than from Berlin’36). This, like the despatch, was relatively well received. Hardinge, who was shortly to leave the Foreign Office to become Viceroy of India, at least admitted that one of the advantages of Aehrenthal as Austrian Foreign Minis32) Cartwright MSS: Hardinge to Cartwright 29 June 1909. See also PRO FO 371/682/109: Minute by Hardinge 2 January 1909 on Rodd to Grey 28 December 1908; Hardinge MSS vol. 17: Hardinge to Lowther 18 May 1909 (copy). 33) Ibid. vol. 15: Cartwright to Hardinge 9 July 1909. 34) Ibid. vol. 19: Cartwright to Hardinge 28 April 1910. 35) See appendix no. 4 p. 193. 36) Hardinge MSS vol. 19: Cartwright to Hardinge 22 June 1910.
