Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
Isolating the Isolator 177 ter was his growing independence of Germany. He concluded: ‘Of course we must always reckon on Austria being a faithfull ally to Germany, but at the same time it will be very much to our advantage if she acts as a drag on German policy in Europe and Asia’37). Cartwright took up this last point in September, reminding Grey that Aehrenthal was reluctant to be dragged into German adventures or to be pushed by her into strained relations with Russia over Balkan matters38). At the height of the Agadir crisis of 1911 he described Aehrenthal’s policy to Nicolson, Hardinge’s successor, as ‘to let Austria act as a sort of “regulator” to maintain the equilibrium between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance: when the Triple Entente weakens he swings away from Berlin; when it is stronger he tightens the links uniting the Triple Alliance .. ,’39). On the death of Aehrenthal in February 1912, he provided Nicolson with an obituary and a review of the Austrian Foreign Minister’s objectives and achievements40). Only in September 1912, on the eve of the greatest dislocation that the Balkan peninsula was to experience before the Great War itself, did he treat the Permanent Under-Secretary to a pointed picture of his own still preferred policies, describing the line London-Paris-Vienna as the only one along which no natural friction should exist, and providing several examples of the successful use of Austrian influence at Berlin to produce restraint on the part of Germany: ‘For these reasons I cannot too strongly impress upon you the important pacific role which Austria is in a position and is willing to play in Europe, and how advisable it is to do all that is in our power to maintain good relations with her’41). The Foreign Office in London never ceased to regard Germany as ‘the isolator’ of Great Britain. Her every move was examined primarily from the point of view of its impact upon British relations with Russia and France, and continued to be invested with the design of being a contribution to British isolation. This was as much the case in regard to the search for an Anglo-German ‘formula’ — a search that spanned four years - as it was in regard to the North Sea Convention proposed in 1907. At the beginning of the Anglo-German negotiations E. A. Crowe wrote that the ‘end and object’ of German foreign policy was ‘to frustrate any combination between other Great Powers in which Germany is not the predominant partner . . . We have witnessed the extraordinarily versatile methods employed ... in the effort to prevent the understanding first between England and France and then between England and Russia. Both France and Russia have undergone the traditional German treatment of alternate bullying and cajoling, as well as 37) Cartwright MSS: Hardinge to Cartwright 28 June 1910. 3S) See appendix no. 5 p. 195-196. 39) See appendix no. 6 p. 196. 40) See appendix no. 7 p. 196-198. 41) Cartwright MSS: Cartwright to Nicolson 12 September 1912. Mitteilungen, Band 35 12
