Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
Isolating the Isolator 175 her . . .’25a); and to Grey to recall that, for that very reason, he had already told Cartwright ‘to be careful to do nothing which would make mischief between Germany and Austria’. Neither the position, nor the language, of the Foreign Secretary, had changed. He still ‘entirely disapproved of interfering between Germany and Austria’ and refused to countenance any attempt to detach Austria from the German alliance26). The powers that be in London remained unmoved either by the information obtained from Aehrenthal’s confidant Dr Szeps that the former merely wished to be more independent and influential within the Triple Alliance27 *); or by Cartwright’s interpretation of the German ultimatum to Russia as a bid to force her unwanted services upon Austria. Far from sympathising with the Austrian Foreign Minister’s reported wishes to see a strong Austria-Hungary, Hardinge was of the opinion that ‘Austria could go to be weakened a little by internal dissensions - she has been too exuberant with her strength of late’2S). And Cartwright’s comment that ‘it is through the army and through the creation of perhaps a more important fleet that Baron von Aehrenthal hopes, with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand [at] his back, to maintain the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the first rank of the European Powers’283) completely backfired. Hardinge considered that the Austrian fleet ‘will in the end be simply another division of the German fleet’. It raised not only the question of the sending of British dreadnoughts into the Mediterranean, but the altogether more important one of increased naval expenditure and taxation29). Cartwright, nevertheless, kept the prospects he saw before the eyes of London30). Towards the end of June 1909 he wrote to Hardinge: ‘We are reaching the parting of the ways: either Austria-Hungary binds herself for many years to come to Germany by some secret engagement, or by the efforts of France and England she may be kept in a semi-independent state in Europe which in a critical moment may yet prove of supreme importance to ourselves. We cannot blame her for looking after her own interests and she must either come to terms with Russia or lean absolutely on Germany’31). Basing himself on Grey’s minute to this letter, Hardinge replied at some length. ‘It is as well to remember’, he wrote, ‘that we can do nothing positive in the way of direct mediation between Austria and Russia, without exposing ourselves to the charge (once more) of endeavouring to isolate Germany. We have, therefore, to be very circumspect in what we do.’ He did not think that 25a) See appendix no. 2 p. 188. 26) PRO FO 371/599/6296: Minute by Grey on Rodd’s no. 47 of 10 February 1909; Hardinge MSS vol. 15: Minute by Grey on Findlay (Dresden) to Hardinge 18 February 1909. 27) Cartwright MSS: Cartwright to Grey 5 March 1909. 2S) See appendix no. 3 p. 189-191; and Cartwright MSS: Hardinge to Cartwright 4 May 1909. 28a) See appendix no. 3 p. 190. 29) Cartwright MSS: Hardinge to Cartwright 18 May 1909. 30) Ibid.: Cartwright to Hardinge and Grey 28 May 1909. 31) Hardinge MSS vol. 15: Cartwright to Hardinge 24 June 1909.
